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INTRODUCTION 
 Economists define the concept “an increase in economic efficiency” 
in three different ways. First, they sometimes define the concept in a 
Pareto-superior sense. A choice is said to be Pareto-superior if and 
only if it makes somebody better off while making nobody worse off—
stated differently, if and only if it moves society to a so-called Pareto-
superior position.1 However, because no (or virtually no) government 
choice is Pareto-superior, economists almost never employ this defi-
nition in practice. Second, economists sometimes employ a “poten-
tially Pareto-superior” definition of “increase in economic-efficiency.” 
A choice increases economic efficiency under this definition if its 
combination with a transaction-costless, appropriate resource trans-
fer would bring the economy to a Pareto-superior position. Third, and 
most often, economists employ what I call the “monetized” definition 
of “increase in economic efficiency.” In the monetized sense of this 
concept, a choice increases economic efficiency if it gives its benefici-
aries the equivalent of more dollars than it takes away from its vic-
tims.2 Indeed, virtually all applied microeconomic policy and law-
                                                                                                                    
 1. Economists sometimes also use the parallel expression “Pareto-inferior” to de-
scribe choices that make somebody worse off without making anyone better off (i.e., choices 
that are economically inefficient in a Pareto-inferior sense of that expression). 
 2. The term “equivalent” is used because the gains and losses may never show up in 
the affected parties’ dollar holdings—indeed, they may not even be capitalizable by the 
parties. Roughly speaking, the beneficiaries’ equivalent-dollar gains equal the number of 
dollars they must receive “in an inherently neutral way” to be made as well off as the 
choice under review would make them, while the choice’s victims’ equivalent-dollar losses 
equal the number of dollars they would have to lose “in an inherently neutral way” to be 
left as poorly off as the choice would leave them. For a detailed analysis of the appropriate 
2001]                          ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 3 
 
and-economics analyses that focus on economic efficiency implicitly 
adopt this monetized definition of “increase in economic-efficiency.” 
 Many, if not most, economists and law-and-economics scholars 
write and speak as if the analysis of economic efficiency in this 
monetized sense is an algorithm for the determination of the right 
answer to all prescriptive moral questions and to all common law, 
many constitutional law, and some statutory legal-rights questions. 
Rather than confining themselves to the claim that their analyses 
reveal which policy would be most economically efficient, these 
scholars typically assert that their analyses reveal the “optimal” pol-
icy or the policy that would secure “the social optimum.” Indeed, even 
when economists do not use these expressions, the policy-
recommendation sections of their economic-efficiency analyses focus 
exclusively on economic efficiency.3 This pattern of behavior is not re-
                                                                                                                    
way to measure the equivalent-dollar gains of a choice’s beneficiaries and the equivalent-
dollar losses of a choice’s victims, see Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the 
Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of “The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Eco-
nomic) Efficiency”: What is Right and Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and 
Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 ILL. L. REV. 485 
(1993) (clarifying the meaning and point of the expression “in an inherently neutral way,” 
providing a critique of the standard way in which economists and economist-lawyers 
measure these gains and losses (including a critique of the Kaldor-Hicks test for economic 
efficiency)) , and demonstrating that the Coase Theorem is wrong for the same reasons 
that the Kaldor-Hicks test is wrong—or, if you prefer, that the arguments that demon-
strate that the Kaldor-Hicks test must be significantly revised require a similar revision of 
the Coase Theorem). I want to anticipate a point to be made later by indicating that 
choices that increase economic efficiency in this monetized sense may not be potentially 
Pareto-superior in our actual, Pareto-imperfect world. In our world, one or more Pareto 
imperfections may make even a transaction-costless transfer—whose combination with the 
choice in question would have moved the economy to a Pareto-superior position in their ab-
sence—sufficiently economically inefficient to preclude not only that transfer but any more 
complicated, transaction-costless resource transfer from securing a Pareto-superior posi-
tion. 
 3. A quick Westlaw search of articles published between 1983 and 1998 revealed at 
least 123 articles in which scholars equated “maximizing economic efficiency” with “secur-
ing the social optimum.” Please note that this tally included articles in which this confla-
tion could be established at a glance. Predictably, the articles dealt with issues that belong 
to a wide variety of traditional doctrinal fields, including antitrust, bankruptcy, civil pro-
cedure, commercial law, contracts, corporate law, environmental law, family law, intellec-
tual property law, international trade law, securities regulation, remedies, regulated in-
dustries, telecommunications law, tort law, etc. By name recognition, I identified forty au-
thors or co-authors as Ph.D. economists. I know several of these authors. A few know the 
limited relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions, but I can assure you that most do not 
agree with the conclusions this Article reaches. 
 I hasten to point out that this usage and its analogues are not restricted to the law-and-
economics literature. It is equally manifest in the “pure” economics literature. For exam-
ple, the 1999 Richard T. Ely Lecture—the major paper given at the American Economic 
Association meetings—developed a “defense of inequality” that does not explicitly mention, 
much less analyze, either any of the implicated moral-rights issues or any non-rights-
related, distributional-value issues. See Finis Welch, In Defense of Inequality, 89 AM. 
ECON. REV. PAPERS AND PROC. 1 (1999). In fact, although this paper gives some attention 
to changes in the empirical differences between the compensation of males and females, of 
people of “European” and “African” descent, of White and Black women, and of White and 
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stricted to the relevant individuals’ scholarly activities. In my experi-
ence, the vast majority of economists and law-and-economics scholars 
also conflate the economic efficiency of a policy option with its social 
desirability when testifying before Congress, state legislatures, and 
administrative agencies—that is, in such non-scholarly venues, they 
also recommend policies solely on the basis of those policies’ economic 
efficiency. 
 One might argue that these practices involve no more than se-
mantic errors—that the economists and law-and-economics scholars 
who write and talk in this way really know that the economically ef-
ficient choice is not always the choice required by our rights-
commitments or the choice that is best, all things considered, includ-
ing distributional values and sometimes economic efficiency. But few 
economists and virtually no law-and-economics scholars admit the 
                                                                                                                    
Black men, id. at 6-11, it says nothing about the possible value significance of such differ-
ences or the circumstances in which they would or would not have some moral significance. 
Although Welch’s Article does not use the expression “economic efficiency” and makes ref-
erence to several possible effects of inequality—for example, on marriage and crime—
whose importance the author may not value solely for economic-efficiency reasons, its sec-
tions on the consequences of inequality and its concluding policy comments make no ex-
plicit or implicit reference to moral norms. Specifically, Welch makes no reference to either 
the moral norms I denominate “moral principles,” which I believe are relevant to moral-
rights analyses, or the moral norms I denominate “personal ultimate values,” which I be-
lieve are relevant to moral-ought analyses. 
 I admit that some economists who think that economic efficiency cannot be defined non-
arbitrarily assume that policies should be evaluated in terms of their impact on a “social 
welfare function” that does not reflect economic efficiency alone. However, this approach is 
uncommon in the law-and-economics literature, derives from an incorrect assumption that 
the concept of “the effect of a choice on economic efficiency” cannot be defined non-
arbitrarily, and in practice conceals as much as it illuminates. This last claim reflects the 
fact that the economists who use this “social welfare function” approach tend to use incor-
rect definitions of “the effect of choice on economic efficiency,” frequently misunderstand 
the relationship between the effect of a choice on economic efficiency and its impact on to-
tal utility, typically ignore the substance of the relevant fairness or justice norms, and 
misanalyze the relationship between the justness or fairness of a choice and its moral per-
missibility or overall desirability. More specifically, at least some of the relevant scholars 
(1) appear to think that justice or fairness judgments reflect the personal ultimate values 
of those who make them and (2) appear to assume that the effectuation of these norms has 
the same prescriptive moral relevance as the satisfaction of other types of preferences, 
tastes, or desires (for example, of the desire for strawberry ice cream). Thus, according to 
some of these scholars, the fact that a choice effectuates a society’s moral-rights commit-
ments increases social welfare, independent of its other consequences, to the extent that, 
but only to the extent that, in so doing, it yields utility to, or increases the “well-being” of, 
those individual members of the society who value that norm. As Part IV argues, this ac-
count is fundamentally at odds with the role that fairness norms play in prescriptive moral 
evaluations in rights-based societies. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness 
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969-70, 980, 982, 1021-38 (2001) [hereinafter Kap-
low & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare]. In any event, contrary to the claims I have often 
heard economists make orally and on four occasions have seen them express in unpub-
lished referees’ reports and comments on colleagues’ manuscripts, I do not think that the 
use of social welfare functions to evaluate policies significantly undercuts the importance 
of analyzing the claims that have been made for the relevance of economic-efficiency con-
clusions for prescriptive moral evaluations and legal arguments. 
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limited relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions in print. In fact, 
several highly respected economists and law-and-economics scholars 
have written well-known articles that make arguments purporting to 
justify the claim that economically efficient decisions are always just 
and/or desirable—arguments that they have not explicitly disavowed 
and that no other economist has refuted.4 
 Moreover, even if those economists and law-and-economics schol-
ars whose writing and speech conflate “maximizing economic effi-
ciency” with “securing the social optimum” know better in one sense, 
I suspect that their semantic errors take hold of them psychologi-
cally. I will admit, ad arguendo, that if they took the trouble to think 
about these issues, many of them would acknowledge the possibility 
that, under some conditions, an economically efficient choice might 
not be morally permissible (that is, consistent with our rights-
commitments) or desirable overall. However, even if they would, 
these scholars still habitually assume that those conditions are not 
fulfilled in the cases with which they are concerned. In addition, even 
if economists never deceive themselves, their misuses of language are 
socially costly because they tend to induce public officials to base 
their decisions exclusively on economic-efficiency considerations. In 
my judgment, economists have had a considerable impact of this kind 
in the United States. They have encouraged American legislators at 
                                                                                                                    
 4. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Efficiency Norm]. 
Although Judge Posner has never explicitly disavowed this position, he may no longer sub-
scribe to it. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 1637 (1998). I use the word “may” because, in this later Article, Posner may be 
admitting no more than that the economist qua economist cannot demonstrate that “a so-
ciety’s ultimate goal” should be to promote “growth, equality, happiness, survival, con-
quest, stasis, [and] social justice.” Id. at 1670. He may continue to believe that each of 
these goals or a maximand in which they are arguments would be best promoted by eco-
nomically efficient choices. The set of well-known economists who have explicitly asserted 
the proposition delineated in the text (though their arguments for this conclusion differ 
from Posner’s) include J.R. Hicks in Foundation of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 
(1939); Harold Hotelling in The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of 
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938); and Mitchell Polinsky in Prob-
abilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407, 407-12 (1972).  
 Posner’s argument in his HOFSTRA Article and the different arguments made by Hicks, 
Hotelling, and Polinsky will be delineated and critiqued in the text below. Admittedly, 
more recently, two respected economists (one of whom is also a lawyer) have argued that, 
at least when evaluating tax policy, it may be optimal to take the distribution of utility (as 
opposed to its maximization) and hence more than economic efficiency into account. How-
ever, these scholars still reject the relevance (and perhaps even the coherence [meaning-
fulness]) of fairness norms that do not focus on utility. See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness 
Versus Welfare, supra note 3; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor 
the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor 
the Poor?]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why The Legal System Is Less Efficient Than 
The Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kap-
low & Shavell, Legal System]. 
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all levels of government to analyze and justify their decisions exclu-
sively in economic-efficiency terms; persuaded President Reagan to 
promulgate an Executive Order requiring administrative agencies to 
reject all new and old regulations that do not pass an economic-
efficiency-based cost/benefit test;5 and encouraged some judges to 
base some of their decisions on economic-efficiency considerations in 
cases in which the internally right answer to the relevant legal-
rights question was not the economically efficient answer.6 For this 
reason, my critique of the positions to which so many economists and 
law-and-economics scholars appear to subscribe is not academic in 
the pejorative sense of that adjective. 
 I actually believe that many economists do not understand the 
limited relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions, that most 
economists who in one sense do understand this fact habitually ig-
nore it, and that economists have misled many public decision mak-
ers into exaggerating the importance of economic efficiency. How-
ever, even if I am wrong on all of these issues, this Article is justified 
because it corrects two deficiencies in the literature: 
(1) No one has ever carefully or correctly analyzed the relevance of 
economic-efficiency conclusions to prescriptive moral and legal-
rights analyses; and 
 
(2) The economics and law-and-economics literature contains sev-
eral incorrect arguments on these issues made by highly regarded 
economists or law-and-economics scholars. These arguments have 
never been disavowed by their authors or adequately criticized by 
anyone else. 
 This Article’s analysis is presented in four parts and an appendix. 
Part I outlines various accounts of prescriptive moral discourse, both 
generally and in the United States particularly. Part II outlines vari-
ous accounts of legitimate7 and valid8 legal argument in the United 
                                                                                                                    
 5. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note 
(1988). Although President Clinton issued an Executive Order requiring administrative 
agencies to “assess all costs and benefits,” to choose the regulatory approach that “maxi-
mize[s] net benefits,” and to “propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determi-
nation that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs,” Exec. Order No. 12,866 
§ 1(a), (b)(5)-(6), 3 C.F.R. 638-39, reprinted in 5 USC § 601 note (1994), Clinton’s Order 
made clear that the benefits to be considered include many “gains” that are not or may not 
belong to the set of equivalent-dollar gains on which traditional cost/benefit analysis fo-
cuses: for example, “distributional impacts,” “equity,” and “environmental” and “public 
health and safety” gains that may not be measured in traditional cost/benefit terms. Id. § 
1(a), 3 C.F.R. 639. 
 6. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974); Saint Barn-
abas Med. Ctr. v. Essex County, 543 A.2d 34, 43 (N.J. 1988) (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 7. In my terminology, the use of an argument to determine what the law is or what 
the substance of a particular legal-rights conclusion is is said to be “legitimate” or “morally 
legitimate” if it is consistent with the relevant society’s moral commitments. 
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States as well as various related conclusions about whether 
internally right answers (unique answers derivable from valid legal 
argument) exist in the United States. Next, Part III demonstrates 
that, regardless of which defensible account one gives of prescriptive 
moral argument, economic-efficiency arguments generally are not 
algorithms for generating prescriptive moral conclusions of any kind. 
More specifically, Part III justifies this conclusion by pointing out 
that economic-efficiency analysis cannot determine the set of people 
who count, is insensitive to many distinctions that play a crucial role 
in moral-rights analysis, and does not consider the independent rele-
vance to “moral-ought evaluations” of what I call “distributional val-
ues,” which always play a major role—indeed, for some, play an ex-
clusive role—in “moral-ought” analysis. Part III also states and criti-
cizes (1) four arguments that economists and law-and-economics 
scholars have made to justify their claim that economic-efficiency 
analysis is an algorithm for the generation of moral-rights conclu-
sions and (2) two arguments that economists have made to support 
the conclusion that economic-efficiency analysis is an algorithm for 
the generation of all, or at least most, moral-ought conclusions. Fi-
nally, Part IV demonstrates that, regardless of which contemporane-
ously supported position one takes on legitimate and valid legal ar-
gument in the United States, economic-efficiency analysis rarely pro-
vides “internally right” answers to legal-rights questions in the 
United States, independent of whether the legal right in question 
derives from an independent moral right, was created to implement 
some “personal ultimate value(s)” or defensible concrete policy goals, 
or was created to secure economic rents for its beneficiaries. The 
APPENDIX sketches six arguably different methodologies that phi-
losophers use to analyze prescriptive moral questions and explains 
why my critique of the claims economists have made for the prescrip-
tive moral relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions does not de-
pend on the correctness of the “qualified conventionalist” approach 
that I take to prescriptive moral analysis. 
                                                                                                                    
 8. In my terminology, the use of an argument to determine what the law is is “valid” 
or “legally valid” if that use is relevant in determining, within the society concerned, the 
internally correct answer to the legal-rights question under investigation. A textual argu-
ment may be legally valid and a related legal-rights conclusion may be internally correct 
even though they are morally illegitimate if the textual argument focuses on a Constitu-
tional text (1) whose concrete implications were understood by its ratifiers and (2) that is 
inconsistent with the moral commitments of the society that promulgated it. Of course, if 
the relevant Constitutional provision were socially important, the failure of the society in 
question to remove it would call into question that society’s moral integrity. 
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I.   PRESCRIPTIVE MORAL EVALUATION 
 Two types of prescriptive moral discourse can be distinguished: 
Moral discourse about what someone or the State is morally obli-
gated to do and moral discourse about what someone or the State 
morally ought to do. These two types of discourse differ in four ways. 
First, in cultures that clearly distinguish these two types of dis-
course, they involve different moral norms. For convenience, I will 
denominate the moral norms used in moral-rights discourse “moral 
principles” and the different moral norms used in moral-ought dis-
course “personal ultimate values.” 
 Second, in cultures that clearly distinguish the two types of dis-
course, they sometimes yield “conflicting” conclusions. In a given 
situation, a moral agent may have no obligation to do something that 
from various legitimate personal-ultimate-value perspectives he or 
she ought to do. And less often, a moral agent may have an obligation 
to do something that, from some personal-ultimate-value perspective 
that is legitimate within its appropriate domain, she ought not do. 
 Third, in “rights-based” societies,9 not only are moral-rights con-
clusions clearly distinguished from moral-ought conclusions but 
moral-rights conclusions trump moral-ought conclusions when the 
two conflict. Conversely, moral-ought conclusions trump moral-rights 
conclusions in “goal-based” cultures. Goal-based cultures consider 
moral-rights discourse as essentially the same as moral-ought dis-
course—that is, references to “moral rights” indicate only that the 
speaker feels strongly about the relevant conclusion and/or is certain 
that it is correct. In goal-based cultures, “moral rights” are valued 
solely as the handmaidens of “moral oughts.” In other words, in goal-
based societies, moral rights are recognized or enforced only if their 
recognition or enforcement promotes the goal the society is commit-
ted to maximizing.  
 Fourth, and finally, although in rights-based cultures most indi-
vidual or State choices do not implicate rights—that is, most choices 
are neither required by nor prohibited by the rights of any rights-
bearing entity—all moral choices can be analyzed from the perspec-
tive of personal ultimate values. 
                                                                                                                    
 9. For a discussion of the distinctions among “rights-based,” “goal-based,” immoral, 
and amoral societies, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: LEGITIMATE 
LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13-34 (1998) [hereinafter 
MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE], and Richard S. Markovits, Legitimate Legal Argu-
ment and Internally-Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 
417-23 (1999) [hereinafter Markovits, Internally-Right Answers]. For analytic purposes, I 
would classify (1) societies in which religious-right or religious-duty conclusions trump in-
dividually-held moral-ought conclusions as a variant of rights-based societies and (2) ideal-
based societies, in which the effect of a choice on the extent to which some ideal is secured 
trumps all other considerations, as a variant of “goal-based” societies. 
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 Societies of moral integrity10 can be either rights-based or goal-
based. The members of particular rights-based societies can be 
committed to basing their moral-rights evaluations and moral-rights-
related conduct on any one of a number of different moral norms.11 
Members of both rights-based and goal-based societies can individu-
ally or personally subscribe to any or a combination of a wide variety 
of moral norms. 
A.   Moral-Rights Argument in the United States 
 I believe that the United States is a rights-based State—that is, 
that this society draws a strong distinction between moral-rights 
analysis and moral-ought analysis and commits itself to the proposi-
tion that moral-rights conclusions trump moral-ought conclusions 
when the two conflict. Although Part III could focus, inter alia, on the 
relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions to generic moral-rights 
analysis, and Part IV could focus, inter alia, on the relevance of eco-
nomic-efficiency conclusions to moral-rights-related legal-rights 
analysis in any rights-based society, I will focus on the relevance of 
economic-efficiency conclusions for the particular types of moral-
rights analysis and moral-rights-related legal-rights analysis to 
which Americans are committed. 
 I have developed elsewhere detailed protocols for determining 
whether a given society is goal-based, rights-based, amoral, or im-
moral as well as for determining the particular moral norm (the basic 
moral principle) that underlies the rights of rights-bearing entities in 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Societies of “moral integrity” are societies whose members and State conform their 
behavior to the moral norm to which they are committed to a difficult-to-specify requisite 
extent. Amoral societies have no moral commitments. Immoral societies are committed to 
effectuating a decision principle that is intrinsically immoral. Obviously, this last state-
ment reflects my belief that the notions “moral” and “immoral” have some essentialist con-
tent. 
 11. This proposition and several others in the text that follows are admittedly con-
testable. Disagreements about them partly reflect disagreements about the methodology 
one should use to investigate the prescriptive moral issues they implicate. Although this 
Article is not the place for a full discussion of the relevant methodological debate, the AP-
PENDIX will provide sketches of some of the more important methodologies that different 
philosophers use to investigate prescriptive moral issues. Philosophers who think that 
there are universally binding norms of justice and use methodologies that are designed to 
discover these norms (methodologies that are said to be “foundationalist” in the broader 
sense of that term) will reject the statement in the text to which this footnote is attached. 
Philosophers who do not think that there are universally binding norms of justice (includ-
ing “conventionalists,” who focus on describing the moral practices of particular communi-
ties) will be willing to accept the proposition that different communities may be committed 
to different norms of justice. The APPENDIX provides brief (admittedly conntestable) 
sketches of four arguably different approaches to justice or moral-rights analysis that are 
foundationalist in the broader sense of that expression as well as accounts of two versions 
of conventionalism, which admittedly occupy extreme positions on the possible convention-
alist continuum. 
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a given rights-based society.12 I have also detailed protocols for de-
termining the characteristics that make a creature a rights-bearing 
entity in a particular rights-based society.13 These protocols have led 
me to conclude that American society is a liberal, rights-based soci-
ety. 
 When I say the United States is a “liberal,” rights-based society, I 
mean that it is committed to 
(1) Classifying as moral-rights-bearing all creatures who have the 
neurological prerequisites to become or remain individuals of 
moral integrity14—that is, to take their moral obligations seriously 
and to attempt to make their lives conform with the personal ulti-
mate values to which they subscribe; and 
 
(2) Treating all rights-bearing entities for which it is responsible 
with equal, appropriate respect and (derivatively) showing appro-
priate, equal concern for their actualizing their morally critical po-
tential to lead lives of moral integrity.15 
 In general, moral-rights arguments aim to discover the conclusion 
that will maximize the net rights-related interests of all relevant 
moral-rights holders. These arguments involve a balancing approach 
quite different from the type of non-rights-oriented, consequentialist 
balancing employed by some American courts. In a liberal, rights-
based State, moral-rights arguments attempt to determine the con-
clusion that best promotes relevant moral-rights holders’ interest in 
being treated with equal, appropriate respect and concern. 
 It may be helpful to concretize this abstract discussion by deline-
ating a few of the more concrete moral rights that moral-rights hold-
ers have in a liberal, rights-based State. More specifically, in a lib-
eral, rights-based culture, a private choice violates a moral-rights 
holder’s right to appropriate, equal respect if it manifests prejudice 
against him, disrespect for him based on his morally irrelevant per-
sonal attributes or group membership,16 or a desire to hurt him for no 
particular reason at all. Relatedly, a State choice violates a moral-
rights holder’s right to appropriate, equal respect if it manifests 
prejudice against him; hurts him for no good reason; fails to secure 
his rights-related interests when the choice does not promote rights-
                                                                                                                    
 12. MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 13-34. 
 13. Id. at 35-39. 
 14. For a detailed discussion of the concept of “being a person of moral integrity,” see 
id. at 39-41. 
 15. Id. at 41-44. 
 16. As would many failures to keep promises made to him or decisions by an actor 
that would create a risk that someone else might suffer an accident-loss or pollution-loss 
that the actor in question would not have made had he placed the same weight on the av-
erage net equivalent-dollar loss his choice imposed on others as on the average net equiva-
lent-dollar gain it secured for him. 
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related interests on balance; fails to give him the opportunity to par-
ticipate appropriately in various legislative, executive, and judicial 
decisionmaking processes; or officially endorses a particular view of 
the first-order good.17 Also relatedly, a liberal, rights-based State 
may violate a moral-rights holder’s right to appropriate, equal con-
cern by failing to ensure that he can make meaningful life choices.18 
B.   Moral-Ought Arguments 
 This section analyzes the structure and possible content of moral-
ought arguments. Regardless of whether a society’s moral-rights 
commitments require or preclude the choice under consideration or 
regardless of whether the society has any moral-rights commitments, 
a person can always analyze whether, from some personal-ultimate-
value perspective, he ought to make or reject the choice. Neverthe-
less, to increase the salience of the discussion that follows, I will fo-
cus on moral-ought arguments in a liberal, rights-based society like 
the United States. I want to emphasize, however, that most of what 
follows also applies to goal-based societies and non-liberal, rights-
based societies. 
1.   The Non-Liberal Moral Norms (Personal Ultimate Values) 
That Play a Role in “Moral-Ought” Evaluations: A Partial List 
and Comparison With the Liberal Basic Moral Principle 
 The liberal basic moral principle I have articulated differs sub-
stantially from the various norms that I think members of our society 
use, either separately or in combination, when making and evaluat-
ing “moral-ought statements.” Thus, the liberal moral norm differs 
from the classical utilitarian norm, which evaluates any claim or act 
according to the effect of its recognition or commission on the total 
                                                                                                                    
 17. It is appropriate for a liberal, rights-based State to endorse the second-order good 
of an individual’s living a life of moral integrity. 
 18. That is, by failing to provide the moral-rights holder with the minimum real in-
come he needs both to reach the point at which he can think about the good and (in our 
kind of society) to have the self-respect necessary to take his life morally seriously; by fail-
ing to put him in a position to have a range of experiences that enable him to make mean-
ingful value and life choices; by failing to provide him with an education that enables him 
to think critically and that informs him of a variety of ethical and life-style alternatives; by 
failing to prevent others, including his parents, from limiting his information-base unac-
ceptably or from constricting his psychological ability to exercise autonomy; by failing to 
protect his privacy, because privacy fosters integrity by giving the actor the opportunity to 
contemplate, to enter into intimate relationships, and to reduce the cost of experimenta-
tion; by failing to preserve and foster in other ways the actor’s ability to enter into and 
maintain intimate relationships, which often lead to self-discovery and enable their par-
ticipants to instantiate their values; and by failing to protect various other liberties whose 
exercise enables an actor to instantiate his or her values when such protection can be pro-
vided without sacrificing weightier rights-related interests of others. For a more detailed 
analysis of the concrete implications of a liberal, rights-based society’s duties of equal, ap-
propriate respect and concern, see id. chs. 3-4. 
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utility experienced by all entities whose utility counts. It also differs 
from the “modern” utilitarian norm, which evaluates a choice by its 
impact on the average utility experienced by all entities whose utility 
counts. Admittedly, like the liberal principle, these utilitarian norms 
can be described as egalitarian, in their case because they treat all 
entities whose utility counts as equals by giving the same weight to 
each unit of utility (by not making the value of a unit of utility de-
pend on the identity or history of the entity experiencing it). How-
ever, utilitarian norms differ from liberal norms because they pro-
ceed from a different assumption about the attributes of an entity 
that cause the entity to be rights-bearing or of moral concern. In par-
ticular, utilitarian norms implicitly assume that the ability to experi-
ence utility is critical to the moral status of an entity while, as we 
saw, the liberal norm assumes that the possession of the neurological 
prerequisites for becoming or remaining an individual of moral integ-
rity is the relevant defining characteristic. 
 The liberal moral norm also differs from the equal-utility egalitar-
ian norm, which values the moral worthiness of a claim or the moral 
desirability of an act by the impact of its recognition or commission 
on the equality of the utility experienced by each moral-rights holder. 
The liberal moral norm differs as well from each of the various non-
liberal equal-opportunity egalitarian norms, which value the worthi-
ness of a claim or choice by the impact of its recognition or commis-
sion on the inequalities of the opportunity that different moral-rights 
holders have to do things other than actualize their potential to be-
come and remain individuals of moral integrity—for example, the 
opportunity they have to develop certain mental or physical skills or 
to perform certain valued social roles. 
 Once more, like the liberal principle, the equal-utility and non-
liberal equality-of-opportunity norms can be described as egalitarian 
because, as their very names suggest, they treat individuals as 
equals by deeming the recipient’s identity and behavioral history 
irrelevant to the evaluation of his or her experiencing utility or 
receiving various opportunities. However, both these norms differ 
from the liberal norm because they implicitly reject the liberal as-
sumption that the defining characteristic of an entity is its potential 
to become or remain an individual of moral integrity. These norms 
differ from each other with respect to the metric by which their hold-
ers define a life’s success. Supporters of the equal-utility norm meas-
ure a life’s success by the utility the relevant entity experiences. In 
contrast, supporters of the non-liberal equal-opportunity norm as-
sume that an individual does something uniquely valuable when he 
makes good use of the particular type of opportunity that such 
evaluators want to be equally available to all and measure the suc-
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cess of a life by the extent to which an individual took advantage of 
the opportunity or set of opportunities they value. 
 The liberal principle differs as well from the equality-of-resources 
norm, which values a claim or an act by the impact of its recognition 
or commission on the equality of the resources—which are measured 
in allocative-cost or “opportunity cost” terms—available to moral-
rights holders. This equality-of-resources norm resembles the liberal 
principle in two ways. First, it is egalitarian because it renders ir-
relevant the identity and the history of each moral-rights holder. 
Second, it allows individuals to select their own metric of success. 
However, the equality-of-resources norm also differs from the liberal 
principle in two respects. First, it differs in the metric it implicitly 
adopts for a “life’s success”—presumably something like the extent to 
which an individual achieves his concrete goals. Second, it differs in 
its particular concern with the resource constraint as opposed to the 
taste-of-the-community constraint on the success of an individual’s 
life as it defines this concept. 
 Finally, the liberal moral norm differs from the various norms 
that different libertarians endorse. Libertarianism differs from liber-
alism most clearly on distributional justice issues and may also be 
associated with a broader definition of liberty than liberalism would 
countenance. In particular, unlike liberals, libertarians assume that 
each moral-rights holder deserves the resources he would have if 
they were obtained through behavior that did not directly violate 
anyone’s rights—for example, by earning or producing them,19 find-
ing them, obtaining them through luck in general, or receiving them 
as a gift or bequest. Moreover, libertarianism may be more likely 
than liberalism to concede both the right of individuals to indulge 
their prejudices in various contexts and the right of some individuals, 
such as parents, to limit the information on which others, such as 
their children, can base their life choices. 
2.   The Structure of Moral-Ought Arguments 
 Like all moral-rights arguments, all moral-ought arguments must 
begin by determining the creatures whose positions ought to be con-
sidered. After this so-called “boundary condition” issue is resolved, 
moral-ought arguments diverge into two families. 
 The first type of moral-ought argument proceeds by estimating 
the equivalent-dollar gains and losses each choice-option will gener-
ate, placing norm-derived weights on these equivalent-dollar gains 
                                                                                                                    
 19. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the phrase “what someone produces” and my 
reason for concluding that the libertarian distributional premise that “people ought to re-
ceive, or are entitled to receive, what they produce” either is conceptually morally mis-
taken or is based on blatantly false empirical assumptions, see id. at 50-53. 
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and losses, and choosing the option that maximizes the total positive 
difference between weighted equivalent-dollar gains and weighted 
equivalent-dollar losses. The set of norms that can best be effectu-
ated in this way includes (most obviously) norms that focus on the 
maximization and/or distribution of utility—paradigmatically, utili-
tarianism and equal-utility egalitarianism, but also variants of other 
norms that focus on whether individuals receive the utility that their 
conduct implies they deserve. However, the set of norms that can 
best be effectuated through this type of argument also includes 
norms that value the equivalent-dollar effects on a choice for reasons 
unrelated to its impact on the affected individuals' utility—for exam-
ple, norms that value the tendency of a choice to produce equivalent-
dollar effects that equalize the availablity of some opportunity to 
relevant individuals, or that provide one or more individuals with a 
specific opportunity for reasons unrelated to the utility that anyone 
will obtain from these individuals' exercising the opportunity. This 
first type of moral-ought argument has eight steps: 
(1) Determine the set of moral-rights holders. 
 
(2) Determine whether a particular choice is required or prohibited 
by the rights of any moral-rights holder. If a particular choice is 
required by our rights-commitments, then that choice ought to be 
made. If a particular choice is prohibited by our rights-
commitments, then the rest of the protocol must be followed to de-
termine which non-proscribed choice ought to be made. If a par-
ticular choice is neither required by nor prohibited by our rights-
commitments, then the rest of the protocol must be followed to de-
termine which choice ought to be made. 
 
(3) Use economic-efficiency analysis to predict the equivalent-
dollar gains that each morally permissible change from the status 
quo will confer on its beneficiaries and the equivalent-dollar losses 
it will impose on its victims. 
 
(4) Specify the personal ultimate value or personal-ultimate-value 
combination on which the relevant moral-ought conclusion will be 
based—inter alia, specify the facts that the value in question 
makes germane to any consideration of the distributional desir-
ability of the choice in question.20 
                                                                                                                    
 20. A number of facts may be relevant to the distributional desirability of a choice, in-
cluding the characteristics of the welfare positions and/or general conduct of the beneficiar-
ies and victims; the moral characteristics of any acts to which the private or government 
choice in question is responding; and the characteristics of any indirect consequences that 
the relevant private or government choices may have. Thus, for utilitarians and various 
kinds of egalitarians, the relevant facts will include such items as the distribution of the 
beneficiaries’ and victims’ pre-choice wealth and incomes. For those libertarians who be-
lieve that people ought to be paid according to what they produce, the relevant facts will 
include such items as the relationship between the beneficiaries’ and victims’ pre-policy 
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(5) Collect the facts that the above value or value-combination 
deems relevant to the distributional desirability of the choice in 
question. 
 
(6) Use the value specification in (4) and the facts in (5) to generate 
weights to be attached to the average equivalent-dollar gain and 
average equivalent-dollar loss yielded by each morally permissible 
change from the status quo. 
 
(7) For each relevant change from the status quo, calculate the 
weighted equivalent-dollar gains the change would generate, the 
weighted equivalent-dollar losses the change would generate, and 
the difference between them. 
  
(8) Evaluate all changes according to the net weighted equivalent-
dollar effect of each: more specifically, recommend the change with 
the highest positive net weighted equivalent-dollar gain or recom-
mend no change if all changes would yield lower net weighted 
equivalent-dollar gains than losses. The evaluator should be indif-
ferent to making a change that yields equal net weighted equiva-
lent-dollar gains and losses. 
 The second type of moral-ought argument proceeds from values 
that cannot be effectuated most desirably by predicting and placing 
weights on equivalent-dollar gains and losses. Some of these values 
(many of which are religious) focus on the intent of the actors to 
bring about certain consequences that are perceived to be bad in 
themselves for reasons that do not focus on their net equivalent-
dollar impact. Moral-ought evaluations that proceed from such val-
ues start with the same two steps with which the first type of moral-
ought argument began and then proceed as follows: 
(3) Specify the personal ultimate value or personal-ultimate-value 
combination on which the relevant moral-ought conclusion will be 
based. 
 
(4) Collect the facts that the above value or value-combination 
deems relevant. 
 
                                                                                                                    
wealth and incomes and their respective “allocative products” (the allocative value of the 
labor of either the last person or the average person who did their type of work with equal 
industriousness and skill). And for liberals, the relevant facts will include such items as 
the relationship between the number of people the private or government choice will en-
able to become and remain individuals of moral integrity by raising their material welfare, 
and the number of people the choice will prevent from becoming and remaining individuals 
of moral integrity by reducing their material welfare. Similarly, for retributionists and 
individuals who believe that people should not profit from their own wrongs, the relevant 
facts would include whether any acts to which a relevant private or government choice re-
sponds were inherently immoral. 
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(5) Use the relevant value or value-combination to assess the de-
sirability of each morally permissible choice. 
 
(6) Recommend the most desirable choice. 
II.   LEGITIMATE AND VALID LEGAL ARGUMENT IN A LIBERAL, RIGHTS-
BASED STATE SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES 
 The nature of the arguments that are legitimate and valid legal 
arguments will vary across different types of moral cultures and, 
quite possibly (with legal practice), among cultures of the same moral 
type. Although I certainly could analyze the relevance of economic-
efficiency conclusions and economic-efficiency analysis for the deter-
mination of legal rights in general, I think it more instructive to do 
so for the various types of legal rights that can exist in liberal, rights-
based societies such as the United States. I recognize that the struc-
ture of legitimate and valid legal argument in the United States var-
ies with the type of legal right being asserted. I also acknowledge 
that many experts doubt that legal arguments can be legitimate or 
valid in the senses in which I use these terms and that some experts 
who agree that my abstract accounts of these concepts are coherent 
and applicable to legal argument in the United States disagree with 
my conclusions about the varieties of legal argument that are legiti-
mate in the United States.21 Some also disagree with my claim that 
arguments of moral principle normatively dominate legal argument 
in the United States.22 I will discuss the positions of various scholars 
who disagree with my account of legitimate and valid legal argument 
in the United States and discuss my own position on these issues to 
put myself in a position to demonstrate that my critique of the claims 
that have been made for the relevance of economic-efficiency argu-
ment for legal-rights argument and legal-rights conclusions does not 
depend on the correctness of my jurisprudential views. 
A.   Legal-Rights Analysis in the United States 
1.   My Position on Legitimate Legal Argument, Valid Legal 
Argument, and the Existence of Internally Right Answers to Legal-
Rights Questions in the United States 
 My basic jurisprudential position can be summarized in the fol-
lowing way: 
                                                                                                                    
 21. See infra text accompanying note 25. 
 22. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Getting Seri-
ous About “Taking Legal Reasoning Seriously,” 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (1999). 
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(1) Using a particular type of argument to determine the content of 
existing law is morally legitimate in a given culture if and only if 
doing so is consistent with that culture’s moral commitments. 
 
(2) An acceptably thorough analysis of the prescriptive moral dis-
course and conduct of members of United States society would re-
veal that America is a liberal, rights-based culture. More specifi-
cally, such an investigation would yield the conclusion that ours is 
a liberal, rights-based culture whose members and State are obli-
gated to show appropriate, equal respect and concern for all moral-
rights holders for whom they are responsible. 
 
(3) An appropriate empirical analysis would reveal that, in addi-
tion to arguments that employ our society’s basic moral principle 
directly (arguments of moral principle), members of our culture 
use different sorts of textual, historical, structural, preceden-
tial/legal-practice-based, and prudential arguments to determine 
the content of pre-existing law. 
 
(4) The preceding conclusions imply that in our liberal, rights-
based culture the use of a particular type of argument to deter-
mine what the law is is morally legitimate if and only if it is con-
sistent with our society’s liberal basic moral principle. This implies 
not only that arguments based on this moral principle are internal 
to law but that they are also the dominant mode of legitimate legal 
argument in a rights-based culture. More specifically, arguments 
of moral principle dominate legitimate legal argument in a rights-
based culture in two ways: They operate directly to determine the 
legitimacy or justness of legal-rights claims that are based on 
moral rights, and they operate indirectly to determine the legiti-
macy of the other general modes of argument that members of the 
relevant culture have used or may use to establish what the law is, 
the variants of each general type of argument it is legitimate to 
use to discover the law, and the legitimate relationship between 
each sub-type of argument that can be legitimately used to dis-
cover what the law is and the internally right answer to the rele-
vant legal-rights question.23 
 
(5) Cultures that are not amoral or immoral—cultures that have 
moral integrity—may have constitutions that instantiate their 
moral commitments less than perfectly. In these cultures, morally 
legitimate legal argument may diverge from legally valid legal ar-
gument. In particular, if such a culture’s constitution contains one 
or more provisions whose text is clearly inconsistent with its moral 
commitments and whose concrete implications were understood by 
                                                                                                                    
 23. For a detailed account of the indirect roles of arguments of moral principle and an 
explanation of my claim that those roles favor my conclusion that there are unique, inter-
nally right answers to all Constitutional law questions in the United States, see 
MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 61-76. 
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their ratifiers at the time of ratification, argument based on such 
text will be legally valid. Indeed, it will be legally valid, though 
morally illegitimate, for such textual arguments to trump argu-
ments of moral principle even though this implies that the inter-
nally correct answer to the relevant legal-rights question is incon-
sistent with the relevant society’s moral commitments. Two points 
should be made about this unpleasant conclusion. First, there are 
limits to the extent to which a society of moral integrity’s constitu-
tional law can be morally illegitimate. Beyond some point, a soci-
ety’s failure to eliminate such illegitimate constitutional provisions 
will lead to the conclusion that it is not a society of moral integrity. 
Second, in my judgment, although the pre-Reconstruction United 
States Constitution contained morally illegitimate slavery clauses 
and failed to impose constitutional obligations on the states to ful-
fill their moral commitments, the current United States Constitu-
tion does not include any morally illegitimate provisions, though it 
does include many “stupidities.”24 
 
(6) Were it not for the possible existence of one or more morally il-
legitimate constitutional provisions, the fact that arguments of 
moral principle dominate morally legitimate legal discourse in our 
culture would imply the existence of internally right answers to all 
legal-rights questions. Absent any morally illegitimate constitu-
tional provisions, the dominance of arguments of moral principle 
would produce this result by rendering legally irrelevant (because 
of their moral illegitimacy) some prudential arguments that favor 
a different conclusion from the one supported by the other, legiti-
mate modes of legal argument and by co-opting the other modes of 
legal argument (textual, historical, structural, preceden-
tial/practice-based, and one type of prudential legal argument) 
that might otherwise favor different conclusions or a conclusion 
that is inconsistent with our basic moral principle. 
 
(7) In fact, the presence of morally illegitimate constitutional pro-
visions does not defeat the conclusion that there are internally 
right answers to all legal-rights questions in a rights-based cul-
ture. In particular, the fact that textual arguments based on mor-
ally illegitimate constitutional provisions dominate arguments of 
moral principle in some constitutional cases does not undermine 
the internally-right-answer thesis, because in these cases there 
still is an internally right answer: the morally illegitimate answer 
favored by the relevant textual argument. 
                                                                                                                    
 24. See CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & SANFORD LEVINSON eds., 1998). 
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2.   My Position on the Legitimate and Valid Way to Identify 
Different Types of Legal Rights in the United States 
 In the United States, legal rights have diverse origins and diverse 
moral bases. Thus, a large number of constitutional rights, most 
common law rights, and some statutory rights simply reflect moral 
rights rather than any official act by our Founding Fathers or any 
government they created. Other common law and constitutional 
rights reflect a combination of the interest of moral-rights holders in 
being given fair notice and the fact that courts make mistakes when 
assessing particular legal-rights claims that were based on alleged 
moral rights. In other words, these rights reflect the fact that a con-
vincing, fair-notice-related moral-rights argument can be made for a 
doctrine of precedent that legitimizes a court’s upholding a legal 
right that would not have existed in a matter of first impression. 
Other constitutional rights, as well as most non-constitutional legal 
rights, were created by constitutional provisions, statutes, regula-
tions, executive orders, or city ordinances that were not required by 
our moral-rights commitments. The creation of a few of these legal 
rights secured a moral right that could have been secured in other 
ways as well. However, most such legal rights were created instead 
to instantiate ultimate values, to achieve concrete goals, or to gener-
ate economic rents for one or more segments of our society’s mem-
bers. 
 In my view, the internally correct way to discover the law varies 
with the basis of the legal right that is being alleged. When the legal 
right at issue purportedly reflects a moral right that pre-exists any 
official act by the State, then “arguments of moral principle” control 
the relevant legal-rights analysis both directly and indirectly in the 
ways previously described. 
 In contrast, when the asserted legal right does not derive from 
such a moral right, arguments of moral principle do not play the di-
rect role that they play when it does. However, in these latter cases, 
arguments of moral principle still play an indirect role. In particular, 
such arguments still determine the weight courts should give to 
precedent, whether a court should hold a particular statute or statu-
tory provision void for vagueness, and the legal force that should be 
given to information about the intent of the legislators who passed a 
particular statute or the intent of the parties who entered into a 
(supposed) contract. In general, when the alleged legal right does not 
derive from a pre-existing moral right, the internally right way to as-
sess the relevant claim is to use: 
(1) Textual arguments that focus on the words of the provision of 
the law-creating act or contract whose meaning is being disputed; 
that focus on whether a particular interpretation of the passage 
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under dispute would render other provisions in the document ir-
relevant or would contradict those provisions at the level of mean-
ing; whether a particular interpretation of the passage under dis-
pute would balance the values, interests, or goals at stake in the 
way in which they were balanced by the other provisions of the 
relevant document; the nature of the document being considered, 
whether it is a constitution, statute, ordinance, or private contract; 
the placement of the relevant provision in the document as a 
whole—for example, whether a disputed provision of a constitution 
is in a power-creating or power-limiting section of the document 
and whether a disputed provision in a contract is in a duty-
creating or remedial section of the document; 
 
(2) “Structural” arguments, which focus on some fundamental con-
stitutional implications of a society’s moral commitments; some 
basic features of a government’s constitutional institutional ar-
rangements; the personal ultimate values or concrete goals a par-
ticular constitutional provision, statute, or ordinance was designed 
to achieve; or the concrete goals that led the parties to a contract 
to participate in the transaction it governs; 
 
(3) “Historical” arguments, which focus on the meaning of the 
text’s individual words or expressions in the relevant context at 
the time of the enactment’s passage or contract’s formation; alter-
native textual formulations that were rejected; the causes of the 
enactment’s passage or contract’s formation; the content of other 
decisions made contemporaneously by an enactment’s supporters 
or a contract’s participants; statements made by an enactment’s 
supporters or a contract’s participants about the values they were 
hoping to further, results they were hoping to achieve, or more 
concrete goals they were trying to secure, etc.; and 
 
(4) Any precedent or interpretive practice that bears on the rele-
vant text’s interpretation. 
B.   Alternative Positions on Legal-Rights Analysis in the United 
States 
 Most legal academics do not accept my position on common law 
and constitutional interpretation. Their disagreement usually re-
flects their rejection of my contention that a strong distinction can be 
drawn between moral-rights and moral-ought discourse; my claim 
that members of our culture do draw such a distinction and do be-
lieve that moral-rights conclusions trump moral-ought conclusions 
when the two conflict; my contention that, to be morally legitimate, 
the use of a legal argument in a given culture must be consistent 
with that culture’s moral commitments; and/or my related argument 
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that arguments of moral principle dominate legitimate legal argu-
ment in our culture. 
 Those who reject my jurisprudential position subscribe to a wide 
variety of alternative jurisprudential views. Some of these alterna-
tive positions relate specifically to constitutional interpretation, but 
others apply to common law, statutory, and regulatory rights. 
Limitations of space preclude me from discussing all the alternatives 
to my position and from discussing those I do consider in great de-
tail.25 However, I need to say enough about a sufficient number of 
them to show that my claim that economic-efficiency analysis is not 
an algorithm for legal-rights analysis does not depend on the cor-
rectness of the jurisprudential position to which I subscribe. 
1.   Philip Bobbitt 
 Philip Bobbitt has argued26 that legal practice is self-legitimizing; 
that our culture’s legal practice is to discover the law by using differ-
ent variants of textual, historical, structural, precedent-related, pru-
dential, and what he calls “ethical” argument, which is related to the 
ethos of limited government; that none of these modes of argument 
dominates; that an internally right answer to a legal-rights question 
exists if and only if all variants of all these modes of argument that 
have been employed to a quantitatively significant extent favor the 
same legal interpretation; that when the different relevant modes of 
argument or different variants of these modes favor different out-
comes, no internally right answer to the legal-rights question at issue 
exists; and that when no internally right answer to a legal-rights 
question exists, a judge must follow his conscience to decide the case. 
2.   Legal Realists 
 From a jurisprudential perspective, the Legal Realists are not a 
uniform group. Some Legal Realists believe no internally right an-
swers to certain legal-rights questions exist because the relevant le-
gal rights turn on the proper interpretation of open-textured lan-
guage in a constitution, statute, administrative regulation, or judicial 
opinion whose meaning is critically indeterminate.27 Other Legal Re-
alists believe that there is no internally right answer to some legal-
rights questions because the relevant legal rights turn on legal prac-
tice—for example, canons of statutory construction or doctrines of 
precedent—that are irresolvably and critically internally-
                                                                                                                    
 25. For a more detailed analysis of a larger set of alternatives to my jurisprudential 
position, see MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 90-194. 
 26. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) . 
 27. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). 
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inconsistent.28 Still other Legal Realists have little interest in 
whether internally right answers to all legal-rights questions exist. 
They are interested, rather, in discovering the determinants of the 
answers that judges give to intellectually contestable or socially con-
tested legal-rights questions, regardless of whether these questions 
are essentially contestable. Relatedly, they are interested in the most 
effective way for lawyers to argue cases whose internally correct 
resolution is contestable or socially contested.29 Some of these latter 
Legal Realists provide socio-economic explanations of judicial deci-
sions in such cases. Others emphasize individual, judge-oriented, 
personal/psychological history or value-preference explanations of 
judicial decisions. Still others offer explanations of judicial behavior 
that focus on the general professional socialization of judges and law-
yers.30 
 Legal Realists do not explicitly address how judges are obligated 
to or ought to decide cases that have internally right answers. I sus-
pect that at least some of these scholars believe that judges ought to 
provide internally correct answers to legal-rights questions when 
such answers are available. This suspicion is supported by the fact 
that some Legal Realists, including Karl Llewellyn, have concluded 
that, when dealing with contract or commercial disputes that cannot 
be resolved by reference to language alone, judges ought to make the 
decision that conforms with the relevant sub-community’s practice 
and expectations.31 To me, this recommendation implies that 
internally right answers exist to the legal-rights questions concerned. 
The internally right answer is the answer that is compatible with the 
legitimate expectations of the parties involved, which in these in-
stances create and are created by the business practices in question. 
In cases in which Legal Realists believe no internally right answer 
exists, they seem to think that judges ought to make good policy 
choices by combining sound social science with personal ultimate 
values (whose contestability they generally do not mention or ex-
plore). 
                                                                                                                    
 28. For a discussion of the canons of statutory construction, see Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). For a discussion of the doctrines of precedent, 
see Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudi-
cation: An Incredible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655 (1999). 
 29. For an argument that Karl Llewellyn belongs in this category, see Neil MacCor-
mick & Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, Llewellyn Revisited, 70 TEX. L. REV. 771 (1992) (book 
review). Llewellyn’s most famous book is K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930). 
 30. For a discussion of these latter variants of Legal Realists, see Brian Leiter, Re-
thinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997). 
 31. This approach is manifest in Llewellyn’s work on The Uniform Commercial Code. 
See also id. at 282. 
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3.   Critical Legal Studies 
 Unlike Philip Bobbitt and many Legal Realists, members of the 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement believe that there are inter-
nally right answers to few or virtually no legal-rights questions.32 
CLS members also disagree with Bobbitt and the Legal Realists 
about how judges should respond to legal-rights questions for which 
there is no internally right answer. Unlike Bobbitt, who thinks that a 
judge should make use of his own personal ultimate values by exer-
cising his conscience and, unlike the Legal Realists, who paid little 
attention to the contestability of personal-ultimate-value choices or 
their individual preference for some values over others, CLS mem-
bers want judges to instantiate the values the CLS members prefer. 
Originally, CLS members indicated that the relevant “legal deci-
sions” should be based on a poorly defined mix of equal-resource and 
equal-opportunity egalitarianism, which they thought socialist politi-
cal programs could best secure. More recently, CLS adherents have 
argued that such decisions should be guided by an inadequately 
specified set of communitarian values. I should admit that CLS 
members usually do not direct their opinions at judges, probably be-
cause their view of law as a weapon of the powerful makes them 
pessimistic about the likelihood that judges would follow their ad-
vice.33 
4.   Legal Pragmatists  
 The Legal Pragmatists have not attempted to provide a detailed 
account of legitimate legal argument. They have confined themselves 
to claiming that judges should adopt the approach to legal interpre-
tation that “works” in some undefined sense. They argue that at-
tempts to derive answers to particular legal-rights questions from 
abstract accounts or grand theories of law, or even from such ac-
                                                                                                                    
 32. In part, their view on this issue reflects their general view that the meaning of 
language is supplied by its interpreter and not its author. And in part, it reflects their mis-
taken claim that the proof of two facts can establish the internal inconsistency of Legal 
Liberalism: first, that the different principles to which Liberal Legalism is committed 
sometimes favor different outcomes in a given case, and second, that a principle that car-
ries the day in one case fails to do so in another. This claim is mistaken because it ignores 
two other facts: first, that, unlike rules, which are supposed to be decisive whenever they 
apply, principles have a dimension of weight, and second, that the relative weights that 
should be assigned to two or more given principles will vary among the cases to whose 
resolution they are relevant.  
 33. A list of the best CLS scholarship would include ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN 
SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
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counts of particular fields of law, do not work. What does work, they 
argue, are approaches that introduce small changes to the law whose 
consequences can be assessed.34 The Legal Pragmatists have never 
specified the criterion or criteria they think should be used to assess 
whether a particular doctrine works. I suspect that they think that 
some ultimate-value combination should be used for this purpose. At 
least, this conclusion is implied by their hostility to grand theory. If 
they believed that moral-rights claims were essentially different from 
moral-ought claims and that at least some legal decisions were sup-
posed to protect moral rights and can be assessed by what I call 
moral principles as opposed to ultimate values, they would not be so 
hostile to the genre of grand theory that attempts to give an account 
of the principles of justice our society has committed to instantiating: 
if moral rights were relevant, a decision that implicates them could 
not “work” unless it secured justice. 
5.   Ronald Dworkin 
 Ronald Dworkin seems to think that legal interpretation some-
times should be dominated by moral-principle analysis and some-
times by a kind of ultimate-value analysis.35 I do not agree with 
Dworkin’s account of legitimate legal interpretation. To my mind, his 
use of a “best light” criterion to assess candidates for our society’s 
“basic moral principle” title (my language, not his) undermines the 
strong distinction between what I call “moral principles” and “per-
sonal ultimate values.” His argument that to be a community of prin-
ciple, or to have moral integrity, a society must consistently imple-
ment some individual ultimate value or specifiable combination of ul-
timate values unjustifiably anthropromorphizes the concept of “the 
moral integrity of a State.” Dworkin’s conception of “a society of in-
tegrity” is unjustifiable in part because, as social-choice theory 
teaches, group decisions will often be inconsistent from any value-
perspective despite the fact that each member of the group has voted 
perfectly consistently. However, for current purposes, the critical 
point is that, on Dworkin’s account, the internally right answer to le-
gal-rights questions (1) sometimes depends on a moral principle of 
“equal respect and concern” similar to the basic moral principle on 
which I claim our society is committed to grounding its moral rights 
                                                                                                                    
 34. The best discussion of Legal Pragmatism I know is Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding 
Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1996). For several other useful examples or 
discussions of Legal Pragmatism, see Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 35. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1978). 
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discourse and conduct and (2) sometimes depends on the ultimate 
values that the State has consistently tried to instantiate.36 
6.   John Hart Ely 
 John Hart Ely maintains that judicial interpretation of the fun-
damental-fairness clauses in the United States Constitution should 
be limited to protecting certain values he claims the Constitution’s 
text indicates are constitutionally fundamental—rights to fair judi-
cial process, rights to fair political representation, and the right of 
minorities not to be disadvantaged by a lack of a fair share of politi-
cal power. According to Ely, judges should reject all other constitu-
tional rights claims in the service of the value of popular sovereignty, 
majoritarianism, or democracy (a value whose basis and content he 
fails to examine).37 I do not think that Ely’s reading of the Constitu-
tion is persuasive or that his conclusion is correct. For present pur-
poses, however, it suffices to note the process values and substantive 
values he thinks should dominate constitutional interpretation. 
7.   Legal Historians of Ideology 
 Other legal academics claim that a review of the historical evi-
dence on the ideological commitments of Americans in the second 
half of the eighteenth century implies that the United States Consti-
tution should be held to instantiate civic-republican, communitarian, 
or libertarian values.38 Once more, although I disagree both with 
their historical conclusions and with the constitutional conclusions 
they base on them, for present purposes the relevant point is their 
conclusion that communitarian or libertarian values should domi-
nate constitutional interpretation. 
8.   Strict Constructionists 
 The final jurisprudential position I will mention is the strict con-
structionists’ position on constitutional interpretation. According to 
the strict constructionists, courts should hold State choices 
unconstitutional only if they contravene the self-declaring meaning 
of the Constitution’s text or the concrete interpretive expectations of 
                                                                                                                    
 36. For a more detailed comparison of Dworkin’s position to my own, see MARKOVITS, 
MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 91-109. 
 37. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
101-02 (1980). 
 38. For a discussion of the relevance of civic-republican and communitarian values to 
constitutional interpretation, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). 
For the possible relevance of libertarian values to Constitutional law and common law in-
terpretation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985), and Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepre-
sentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 455 (1978). 
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the text’s ratifiers.39 In all other cases, judges should hold State 
choices constitutional. Once more, this conclusion is said to be justi-
fied by our supposed (unexamined) commitment to popular sover-
eignty, majoritarianism, or democracy. 
 I do not agree with this position. No text has self-declaring mean-
ing. The Framers did not think,40 and our general social practice does 
not suggest, that interpreters of this kind of document should be 
bound by its drafters’ and ratifiers’ specific expectations. Judicial re-
view is not inconsistent with our commitment to democracy, which is 
a corollary of the same liberal basic moral principle from which our 
other substantive and process rights derive. For present purposes, 
however, the critical point is the substance rather than the persua-
siveness of strict constructionism. 
III.   ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AS AN ALGORITHM FOR 
GENERATING MORAL-RIGHTS AND MORAL-OUGHT CONCLUSIONS IN A 
LIBERAL, RIGHTS-BASED SOCIETY 
A.   Economic-Efficiency Analysis as an Algorithm for Generating 
Moral-Rights Conclusions in a Liberal, Rights-Based Society 
 This section argues against the claim that economic-efficiency 
analysis is an algorithm for generating moral-rights conclusions in a 
liberal, rights-based society. It establishes this conclusion by demon-
strating that economic-efficiency analysis is insensitive to four issues 
or distinctions that sometimes play a critical role in moral-rights 
analysis. It also explains why the four arguments that some econo-
mists have offered to establish their contrary conclusion that eco-
nomic-efficiency analysis is an algorithm for the generation of moral-
rights conclusions in our culture cannot bear scrutiny. 
1.   The Insensitivity of Economic-Efficiency Analysis to 
Considerations That Play Crucial Roles in Some Liberal, Moral-
Rights Analyses 
 Four deficiencies of economic-efficiency analysis are relevant in 
the current context. First, economic-efficiency analysis can provide 
no insight into the defining attributes of moral-rights holders. It 
cannot identify the creatures or entities that have rights-related in-
terests; indeed, it cannot even establish its own boundary condition 
(cannot help the economist identify the creatures or entities whose 
equivalent-dollar gains and losses or revealed preferences count for 
                                                                                                                    
 39. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on 
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019 (1992). 
 40. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885 (1985). 
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economic-efficiency-analysis purposes). Second, economic-efficiency 
analysis does not distinguish between prejudices and other tastes. 
Third, economic-efficiency analysis does not distinguish between (1) a 
party’s psychological or material welfare interest or concern in an 
event, decision, or piece of information and (2) its “entitlement” in-
terest or concern in the relevant matter. And fourth, just as eco-
nomic-efficiency analysis cannot solve the boundary condition issue, 
it cannot reveal the basis of our negative rights and positive rights.41 
The last three of these deficiencies are interconnected: all relate to 
the fact that economic-efficiency analysis is insensitive to the liberal 
duties of respect and concern. 
 The inability of economic-efficiency analysis to identify whose in-
terests count precludes such analysis from generating moral-rights 
conclusions whenever those conclusions turn on whether a particular 
creature is a moral-rights holder—for example, whether a fetus or 
one of its precursors is a moral-rights holder in an abortion or in tort 
cases, whether someone in an irreversible coma is a moral-rights 
holder, or whether members of future generations are moral-rights 
holders. The fact that economics does not distinguish prejudices from 
other tastes causes the economically efficient conclusion to diverge 
from the conclusion that would secure the relevant parties’ moral 
rights in a liberal, rights-based society in cases that involve dis-
crimination42 in which the discriminators do not have the right to en-
gage.43 This deficiency would therefore be critical in those slavery 
cases, school-segregation cases, large-firm employment discrimina-
tion cases, and segregative zoning cases in which the operative 
prejudices made the relevant discrimination economically efficient. 
The insensitivity of economics to the moral status of the various 
kinds of “welfare interests” that individuals may have in particular 
subjects or outcomes may cause the economically efficient conclusion 
to diverge from the conclusion that would secure the rights of the 
relevant individuals in cases in which someone has a psychological or 
material welfare interest that our moral commitments imply should 
be given no weight or even a negative weight. Cases involving 
parties—such as peeping Toms or readers of gossip columns—who 
place a high equivalent-dollar value on information that is none of 
their legitimate concern fall into this category. Indeed, in such cases, 
the reference to “weights” is actually misleading: the securing and/or 
“publication” of the information in question should rather be said to 
                                                                                                                    
 41. That is, the positive rights that individuals have to certain resources or opportu-
nities. 
 42. In the pejorative sense of the word. 
 43. There are situations in which individuals do have a moral right to indulge their 
prejudices. For example, individuals are entitled to base their choice of a spouse, inter alia, 
on their prejudices. 
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be impermissible because it violates the privacy interest of the party 
to whom the information pertains. Economic-efficiency analysis 
would also fail to yield correct moral-rights conclusions on this ac-
count when the issue is the right of an individual to engage in con-
duct he finds attractive because he places a high equivalent-dollar 
value on inflicting pain on or degrading a moral-rights holder.  
 The inability of economics to determine whether a possible moral-
rights holder has a positive right to something makes economic-
efficiency analysis an unsuitable surrogate for moral-rights analysis 
whenever the force of the argument for securing a moral-rights 
holder’s right is not captured by the equivalent-dollar value that the 
relevant beneficiary places on the good or service in question. This 
deficiency of economics is relevant not only (as we have just seen) 
when assessing the moral rights of the potential victim of a wealthy 
sadist but also when assessing the positive right of a potential moral 
agent to the resources he requires to become and remain an individ-
ual of moral integrity, regardless of whether he is mentally or physi-
cally handicapped. 
2.   Four Erroneous Arguments That Underlie the Mistaken 
Conclusion That Economic-Efficiency Analysis Is an Algorithm for 
the Assessment of Moral-Rights Claims 
 Obviously, the various individual scholars whom I would classify 
as supporters of standard law-and-economics do not make all the er-
rors that this section attributes to members of their group. Neverthe-
less, I believe that most economists and lawyer-economists who claim 
that the analysis of economic efficiency provides an algorithm for the 
“correct” resolution of all moral-rights claims subscribe to this posi-
tion because they accept the first erroneous argument as well as one 
or more of the second through fourth erroneous arguments detailed 
below. 
 The first argument in question is negative. It responds to my kind 
of critique of the claim that economic-efficiency analysis is an algo-
rithm for moral-rights analysis by rejecting as incoherent44 my ac-
count of our society’s moral-rights discourse. Admittedly, proponents 
of this argument fall into two camps. Some believe that the very con-
cepts “fairness,” “justice,” and “moral rights” (as opposed to my con-
ceptions of them) are incoherent. Others believe that these concepts 
(as opposed to my conceptions of them) have a coherent meaning that 
is compatible with their claim that economic-efficiency analysis is an 
algorithm for moral-rights analysis. 
                                                                                                                    
 44. That is, lacking objectively ascertainable denotative meaning. 
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 Numerous discussions that I have had with economists who take 
this position have led me to conclude that their belief that my con-
ception of moral-rights argument is incoherent reflects their broader 
view that, to be coherent, an argument must contain only non-
contestable, mechanically ascertainable critical concepts and must 
require no conceptually contestable balancing of considerations 
(paradigmatically, should involve the derivation of conclusions from 
a mathematical formula).45 I do not deny that one could make other 
arguments for the proposition that my kind of account of moral-
rights discourse is essentially non-sensical. Philosophers such as A.J. 
Ayer46 and psychologists such as B.F. Skinner47 have done so. How-
ever, their conclusion is now rejected by philosophers such as Rawls 
and Dworkin, who argue that meaningful, consistent, complementary 
reasons whose point is revealed by normative theory can establish 
moral-rights conclusions and that moral argumentation is capable of 
providing reasons as opposed to mere inclinations or tastes for ac-
tion.48 
 The next three relevant arguments are positive: They attempt to 
justify the claim that economic-efficiency analysis is an algorithm for 
generating moral-rights conclusions by demonstrating that economic-
efficiency analysis will always yield just conclusions. The first con-
tains the following two premises: 
(1) The decision that maximizes the total utility of all moral-rights 
holders is the just decision, the decision that secures the relevant 
parties’ moral rights; and 
 
(2) Given the impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of 
utility, it is appropriate to assume that the equivalent-dollar gains 
                                                                                                                    
 45. I have had to rely on discussions with economists rather than on arguments they 
have published because the economists who take the position I am now addressing do not 
argue for it in print—they either assert it without justification or (worse yet) simply as-
sume it to be true. For a recent example in which two highly respected law-and-economics 
scholars (a lawyer-economist and a lawyer) simply assert the incoherence of fairness ar-
guments that do not focus on the maximization or distribution of utility or welfare in an 
Article that purports to demonstrate the irrelevance of such fairness considerations, see 
Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 3. Admittedly, Kaplow and Shavell 
have a second (equally indefensible) reason for concluding that fairness should be ig-
nored—namely, that even if fairness notions have denotative meaning, their consideration 
would not lead an evaluator to alter his conclusions. 
 46. A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC (1952). 
 47. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). 
 48. My treatment of the negative argument just discussed in the text has profited 
from my reading of Benjamin C. Zipursky, Should Tort Professors Use Only Welfarist Con-
cerns? A Commentary on Kaplow and Shavell’s “Principles of Fairness v. Human Welfare,” 
(2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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and losses a choice generates will be associated with equal average 
utility gains or losses.49 
 Neither of the premises can bear scrutiny. Even if one ignores the 
problematic character of mapping the various affective experiences 
that human beings have50 into utility; the difficulty that utilitarians 
have in justifying any boundary condition that limits the creatures 
whose utility counts to human beings;51 the fact that utilitarianism 
implies that the moral quality of any individual’s conduct is essen-
tially irrelevant to the amount of resources he ought to receive 
(though it may be relevant for instrumental reasons); and the related 
fact that utilitarianism does not take the distinction between indi-
viduals seriously, no foundationalist, Aristotelian, or constructivist 
argument has established the objective correctness of utilitarianism. 
Furthermore, no conventionalist argument can establish its internal 
correctness, since members of our culture do not decide moral-rights 
or justice questions by applying a utilitarian standard. Among other 
things, utilitarianism does not capture our moral practices because it 
does not distinguish between moral-rights discourse and moral-ought 
discourse and because it fails to make the intentionality of actors di-
rectly relevant to the right answer to any moral-rights question one 
could pose about their position. 
 Moreover, even if the internally right answer to any relevant 
moral-rights question were always the answer that maximized util-
ity, the answer to those questions that maximized economic efficiency 
would not be the internally right answer to such questions. Cer-
tainly, a contrary conclusion cannot be established by citing the sup-
posed impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of utility.  
 Such an argument fails for two reasons. The first is admittedly 
contestable. I reject the premise that it is impossible to make inter-
personal comparisons of utility. Certainly, we at least purport to 
make such comparisons frequently. Thus, we say that Ed is happier 
than Dick. We give a particular gift to Mary rather than to Jane be-
                                                                                                                    
 49. Richard Posner made this standard economics argument in the first edition of his 
famous book. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 241 (1973). I have heard 
many economists make precisely the same argument. I write “I have heard” because 
economists articulate this assumption orally rather than in print. For a discussion of 
economists’ historic belief in the impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity, see I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 13 (2d ed. 1950). Admittedly, 
Kaplow and Shavell operate on the assumption that interpersonal comparisons of utility 
are possible and recognize that, from various value-perspectives that cannot be dismissed 
as incoherent or objectively wrong, it may be desirable to focus on the distribution of utility 
for reasons that are at least partially unrelated to its maximization. See Kaplow & Shavell, 
Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 3. 
 50. For example, ecstasy, happiness, satisfaction, pleasure, displeasure, pain, dissat-
isfaction, depression, and terror. 
 51. For example, a boundary condition that excludes non-human animals who can ex-
perience “utility.” 
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cause we think Mary will get more pleasure from it. Or we decide to 
invite Ted and Alice rather than Bob and Carol to a dinner party be-
cause we think that the couple Ted and Alice will enjoy it more than 
the couple Bob and Carol, that our other guests will get more pleas-
ure from interacting with Ted and Alice than from interacting with 
Bob and Carol, or that the party will maximize the utility of its par-
ticipants taken as a group if Ted and Alice are invited. Of course, we 
may be fooling ourselves when we make such calculations and state-
ments: the kinds of evidence we use to make and evaluate the rele-
vant claims52 may not in fact be adequate for the purpose. However, I 
do not see how one can hold such a position without lapsing into sol-
ipsism: that is, if the kinds of evidence to which I have referred do 
not justify conclusions about the affective states of other minds, I do 
not understand the basis on which one can presume that other minds 
exist. 
 The second reason that the “impossibility of making interpersonal 
comparisons of utility” argument fails is that, contrary to its second 
premise, it is not appropriate or neutral to assume that the average 
equivalent-dollar gained by a choice’s beneficiaries and the average 
equivalent-dollar lost by a choice’s victims involve the same absolute 
change in utility for the party in question. This equal-average-utility 
assumption is arbitrary and counterintuitive, not neutral and appro-
priate. For both reasons, therefore, I do not think that one could es-
tablish the universal, objective, or internal correctness of the most 
economically efficient resolution of a moral-rights issue by citing the 
supposed impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of util-
ity—even if utilitarianism did capture the universally binding norm 
justice or our society’s justice conception. 
 The second positive argument that has led many economists to 
conclude that economic-efficiency analysis is an algorithm for the 
generation of moral-rights conclusions contains the following two 
premises: 
(1) Justice is an increasing function of the extent to which a vari-
ety of liberal principles (in my terminology, more concrete corollar-
ies of the basic liberal principle) and personal ultimate values are 
secured; and 
 
(2) Decisions that increase economic efficiency increase the extent 
to which these various principles and values that are constitutive 
                                                                                                                    
 52. For example, evidence that relates to facial expressions, tone of voice, demeanor in 
general, our own assessments of our own experience, and the reports others give of their 
experiences. 
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of justice are secured, in comparison with the status quo ante, to a 
far greater extent than is generally recognized.53 
 I have two objections to this argument. First, I do not think that 
the argument’s definition of justice54 either has been established by 
any (narrowly-defined) foundationalist, Aristotelian, constructivist, 
or natural law argument or captures our moral-rights practices. Sec-
ond, even if the argument’s first premise correctly formulates the 
universally binding concept of justice, or our society’s conception of 
justice, and even if its second premise correctly asserts that economi-
cally efficient decisions increase the extent to which the principles 
and values that are arguments in its conception of justice are secured 
in comparison with the status quo ante,55 this argument would not 
justify the conclusion that economically efficient decisions promote 
justice as formulated as much as some other, less-economically-
efficient decision might do. 
 The third positive argument that has led some economists to con-
clude that economically efficient decisions are always just is an ar-
gument from hypothetical consent.56 They contend that: 
(1) Economically efficient decisions, or at least a broad subset of 
such decisions including virtually all the kinds of common law de-
cisions judges must make, are in everyone’s ex ante interest; 
 
(2) Everyone would, therefore, consent to such decisions ex ante if 
given the opportunity to do so; 
 
(3) The making of economically efficient decisions is therefore con-
sistent with, perhaps is required by, our commitment to autonomy; 
and 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Richard Posner basically made this argument in Posner, Efficiency Norm, supra 
note 4. 
 54. The argument defines justice as a function whose value increases with the extent 
to which a variety of liberal moral principles and personal ultimate values are secured. 
Note the mathematical character of the first premise’s definition of justice. 
 55. Indeed, even if such decisions increase the extent to which the relevant principles 
and values are secured to a far greater extent than is generally recognized. 
 56. Admittedly, some proponents of this argument may not take it to be a separate 
argument for the justness of economically efficient decisions. In particular, although none 
of the relevant scholars has even made this point, some scholars who make the hypotheti-
cal-consent argument may find it salient because they believe that (1) if it could be shown 
that hypothetical consent would be given to all economically efficient policy choices, that 
demonstration would establish that economically efficient policies would always protect 
the autonomy interests of those they affect, and (2) autonomy is one component of the kind 
of envelope concept of justice that they, as well as proponents of the second positive argu-
ment just described, adopt. I should also admit that something like this hypothetical-
consent argument may be playing a role in the third positive argument to be discussed in 
the text—namely, that all economically efficient choices ought to be adopted because a rule 
requiring them to be made would move the economy to a Pareto-superior position in the 
long run. However, the importance of consent arguments in philosophical debate has led 
me to consider this “hypothetical-consent” argument separately here. 
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(4) Our conception of justice makes autonomy paramount.57 
 Three objections can be made to this argument. The first is proba-
bly the least important in this context: Even if, as I believe, one se-
cures justice by making those choices that maximize moral-rights-
related interests on balance, and even if, in a liberal, rights-based so-
ciety, the basic duty of respect generally implies that each competent 
moral-rights holder has a prima facie right to develop his own con-
ception of the good and to act on that conception constrained only by 
the moral rights of others, the liberal, rights-based State’s commit-
ment to autonomy will not imply that it is bound to allow individuals 
to make all choices they desire when their choice does not disserve 
the moral-rights-related interests of others. For example, a liberal, 
rights-based State is not obligated to allow the moral-rights holders 
for whom it is responsible to sell themselves into slavery, to take ad-
dictive drugs that will cause them to lose their autonomy, or to enter 
into various kinds of relationships that seem highly likely to cost 
them their autonomy. Nor, I suspect, is it required to allow them to 
ride motorcycles without wearing helmets, even if no one else will be 
affected by their avoidable injury. 
 The second and third objections to the argument from hypotheti-
cal consent are more important in the current context. The second 
objection argues that the autonomy argument from consent requires 
actual consent, not hypothetical consent. The fact that someone 
would have consented to something if given the opportunity to do so 
is not an adequate predicate for concluding that his autonomy inter-
ests are furthered by holding him to a deal or arrangement to which 
he did not consent. For example, the fact that on Monday an individ-
ual would have accepted a deal or arrangement or policy that will 
harm some people ex post because at that time he did not know 
whether he would be an ex post beneficiary or victim of the choice in 
question does not in itself bind him to accept it on Wednesday, when 
he knows its actual results. Admittedly, the features of the policy 
that would have led him to accept it on Monday may provide a basis 
for the conclusion that the policy in question was just. However, any 
argument that relies on those features is not a consent argument. 
 Third, even if hypothetical consent would establish the justness of 
any policy, the “hypothetical consent” argument would not establish 
the justness of the overwhelming majority of economically efficient 
choices of any kind because neither economically efficient choices in 
general nor the economically efficient resolution of common-law-
rights questions are likely to leave everyone better off ex ante while 
                                                                                                                    
 57. This argument is best articulated by RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
JUSTICE 92-99, 101-03 (1981). 
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leaving no one worse off ex ante. Proponents of the hypothetical-
consent argument58 have vastly overestimated the frequency with 
which economically efficient policies will leave all those they affect 
better off ex ante. In my judgment, economically efficient policies will 
virtually always have one or more ex ante losers. 
 Richard Posner, the major proponent of the hypothetical-consent 
argument for the justness of all economically efficient choices, has 
tried to respond to this reality, whose empirical importance he vastly 
underestimates, by insisting that “only a fanatic would insist that 
unanimity be required” in this context.59 In fact, however, for consent 
arguments to work, there must be unanimity. In this context, fanati-
cism is the order of the day. In short, none of the arguments for the 
supposed justness of economically efficient decisions or for the inco-
herence of the concept of justice can bear scrutiny. 
B.   Economic-Efficiency Analysis as an Algorithm for Generating 
Moral-Ought Conclusions in a Liberal, Rights-Based Society 
 Economic efficiency is not the only personal ultimate value on 
which moral-ought evaluations are based. In fact, economic efficiency 
is not even a personal ultimate value: we do not value greenbacks or 
greenback equivalents in and of themselves. Nor is there any reason 
to believe that the things that we do value are monotonically related 
to economic efficiency. For these reasons, it would be extremely sur-
prising if the analysis of economic efficiency were an algorithm for 
generating moral-ought conclusions in our culture. This section 
elaborates on this point by examining in more detail the ability of 
economic-efficiency analysis to generate the same conclusions as the 
two types of moral-ought arguments previously distinguished. This 
section also criticizes two arguments that some economists claim jus-
tify their conclusions that economic-efficiency analysis is an algo-
rithm for the generation of all non-tax-policy moral-ought conclu-
sions. 
                                                                                                                    
 58. Posner cites “implied warranties of habitability” decisions as an example of eco-
nomically inefficient, common law decisions that leave everyone worse off ex ante. Id. at 
102. My own study demonstrates that those decisions will leave the members of some 
groups ex ante better off and the members of other groups ex ante worse off in circum-
stances in which the individuals in question will be able to determine ex ante the group to 
which they belong. Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency 
and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1815 (1976). I have no doubt that this is the case for most common law decisions, 
and a fortiori for public policy choices in general. 
 59. POSNER, supra note 49, at 97. 
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1.   Three Reasons Why Economic-Efficiency Analysis Is Not an 
Algorithm for the Generation of Moral-Ought Conclusions in Our 
Culture 
 For at least three reasons, economic-efficiency analysis cannot 
serve as an algorithm for the generation of moral-ought conclusions 
in our culture. First, economic-efficiency analysis cannot identify the 
creatures whose positions we ought to consider. Second, even if, con-
trary to fact, the first point could be ignored and economic-efficiency 
conclusions were always identical to utilitarian conclusions, eco-
nomic-efficiency analysis could not serve as an algorithm for the gen-
eration of all moral-ought conclusions in our society because many 
such evaluations are made from a value-perspective that is either not 
exclusively utilitarian or not utilitarian at all. This fact is salient be-
cause the non-utilitarian values in question will not always favor 
economically efficient decisions. Thus, it will usually not be economi-
cally efficient to give everyone the same amount of resources since, 
from the perspective of economic efficiency, doing so will distort the 
incentives of individuals to invest in their human capital, to do the 
type of labor that is most economically efficient for them to perform, 
and to work as long and as assiduously as would be economically effi-
cient. For the same reason, it will usually not be economically effi-
cient to distribute resources so as to equalize the utility that all indi-
viduals obtain from them or that all individuals experience alto-
gether. It will also not be economically efficient to give everyone the 
same opportunites. For example, since a decision to allow some indi-
viduals to perform a socially valued task will usually be less eco-
nomically efficient than a decision to allow other individuals to do so, 
the effectuation of this variant of the equal-opportunity norm will 
usually be economically inefficient. As Part IV will suggest, the same 
conclusion will hold for many types of libertarian norms. Third, even 
if one could ignore the first, boundary-condition issue and all moral-
ought evaluations were based purely on utilitarianism in our culture, 
economic-efficiency analysis could not serve as an algorithm for the 
generation of all moral-ought conclusions in our culture because the 
choice that maximizes economic efficiency is not generally the choice 
that maximizes utility. Thus, a choice to shift from a less economi-
cally efficient option to the most economically efficient option will de-
crease utility if the marginal utility of money over the relevant range 
to the shift’s victims is sufficiently higher than the marginal utility of 
money over the relevant range to the choice’s beneficiaries. For ex-
ample, a choice that increases economic efficiency by giving its bene-
ficiaries the equivalent of a $100 gain while imposing the equivalent 
of a $50 loss on its victims will decrease utility if the utility-value of 
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the average equivalent-dollar lost is more than twice the utility-value 
of the average equivalent-dollar gained.60 
2.   A Critique of Two Arguments That Some Economists Believe 
Establish the Ability of Economic-Efficiency Analysis to Serve as 
an Algorithm for Generating All, or Most, Public Policy Moral-
Ought Conclusions in Our Culture 
 a.   A Critique of the Argument That All Economically Efficient 
Decisions Ought to Be Made Because Making Them Will Bring the 
Economy to a Pareto-Superior Position.—Some economists believe 
that economic-efficiency analysis’ ability to generate all relevant 
moral-ought conclusions can be established by an argument based on 
the following two premises: 
(1) Any decision that moves the economy to a Pareto-superior posi-
tion (that makes somebody better off without making any one 
worse off) ought to be made; and 
 
(2) A policy of making all economically efficient decisions will, over 
the long haul, make some people better off and no one worse off 
than they would be if all economically efficient decisions were re-
jected.61 
Unfortunately, this argument cannot bear scrutiny: both its premises 
are wrong, and, even if they were right, they would not establish its 
conclusion. 
 The first premise is wrong because, from some legitimate per-
sonal-ultimate-value perspectives,62 some moves to Pareto-superior 
positions may be morally undesirable.63 The second premise is em-
pirically wrong because, given the fact that individual economically 
efficient decisions may have substantial, adverse distributional ef-
fects on some of their victims, even over the long haul a decision to 
make all economically efficient decisions might not move the society 
to a position that is Pareto-superior to the status quo ante. 
 Moreover, even if the two premises of this argument were correct, 
the argument would not justify the conclusion that the economically 
efficient choice always ought to be made, because, from various per-
sonal-ultimate-value perspectives, one or more moves that are not 
                                                                                                                    
 60. As might occur if the relevant beneficiaries are rich while the relevant victims are 
poor. 
 61. See Hicks, supra note 4; Hotelling, supra note 4. See also Polinsky, supra note 4, 
at 407-12. 
 62. For example, from the standpoint of retributionist values or, more generally, val-
ues that require rewards or material welfare to match the quality of the relevant actor’s 
moral performance in general. 
 63. For example, choices that benefit a heinous criminal and harm no one in any 
straightforward sense. 
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Pareto-superior in comparison with the status quo ante may be pref-
erable to a move that is Pareto-superior in comparison with the 
status quo ante. 
 b.   A Critique of the Double-Distortion Argument Argument.—The 
“Double-Distortion Argument” argument demonstrates that, transac-
tion-cost considerations aside, it will always be more economically ef-
ficient to redistribute income from members of one earned-income 
class (the disfavored earned-income class) to members of another 
earned-income class (the favored earned-income-class)64 by making 
taxes vary appropriately with their earned incomes rather than by 
making (1) the prices the government charges for the various goods 
and services it sells vary with the earned income of the buyer, (2) the 
legal liability and damage rules courts use to resolve legal rights dis-
putes vary with the relative earned incomes of the plaintiffs and de-
fendants, or (3) the size of the civil fines the government imposes on 
a wrongdoer vary with his earned income. Any decision of the latter 
sorts would disserve the goal of maximizing economic efficiency if it 
is viewed in isolation. More specifically, the “Double-Distortion Ar-
gument” argument maintains that this conclusion is justified 
because, administrative-transaction-cost considerations and other 
Pareto imperfections aside, taxes on earned income cause economic 
inefficiency solely by distorting the incentive to perform market la-
bor, as opposed to performing untaxed do-it-yourself labor or consum-
ing untaxed leisure, while the pricing policies and legal rules listed 
above distort two kinds of choices on these assumptions—namely, 
they distort both the choice to consume the relevant product or en-
gage in the relevant injurious conduct and (derivatively) the choice to 
perform market labor. Proponents of the Double-Distortion Argu-
ment argument correctly point out that those who advocate redis-
tributing income between earned-income classes by making the 
prices, damage awards, and civil fines an individual must pay an ex-
plicit function of his earned income when such policy choices would 
cause economic inefficiency by distorting purchasing and injurious-
                                                                                                                    
 64. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell wrote the first Article to be published in a law-
and-economics journal on the prescriptive-moral implications of the Double-Distortion Ar-
gument. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, supra note 4, at 669. However, essentially 
the same argument was made earlier in two Articles (one of which Shavell wrote on his 
own) in economics journals. See Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional 
Objectives Should Affect Taxes But Not Program Choice or Design, 79 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF 
ECON. 264 (1979); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal 
Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 
AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981). For some later usages of this argument, see Louis Kaplow, The 
Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 
513, 517 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 744 n.99, 745 n.102 (1996). For Kaplow and 
Shavell’s most recent defense of their position, see Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules 
Favor the Poor?, supra note 4. 
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conduct decisions have ignored the fact that such policies will have 
the same distorting effect on the relevant individual’s market-
labor/do-it-yourself labor/leisure incentives and choices as would an 
earned-income tax that generated the same redistribution. 
 The Double-Distortion Argument actually does justify the follow-
ing, relatively unimportant proposition: if transaction-cost considera-
tions do not undermine this conclusion and taxes on earned income 
are not only the more economically efficient way to redistribute in-
come between earned-income classes but the more desirable way to 
do so from the relevant personal-ultimate-value perspective, one al-
ways ought to redistribute income between earned-income classes ex-
clusively by varying tax rates on earned income appropriately when 
this option is politically available. 
 However, many economists and law-and-economics scholars seem 
to believe that the Double-Distortion Argument implies the correct-
ness of two more ambitious prescriptive moral conclusions. First, 
that legislators and others—such as administrative rulemakers—
who exercise legislative power ought never try to redistribute income 
by adopting economically inefficient policies other than taxes on 
earned income. Second, that judges and others making adjudicative 
decisions ought never sacrifice economic efficiency to instantiate dis-
tributional norms or achieve distributional goals other than by en-
forcing statutes that impose taxes on earned income.65  
 At least six objections can be made to these two propositions 
and/or to the claim that the Double-Distortion Argument warrants 
them.66 First, these propositions ignore the fact that even if one can 
instantiate a given distributional value to the relevant desired extent 
least economically inefficiently by varying earned-income tax rates 
exclusively, that conclusion does not guarantee that such an earned-
income tax policy will be more desirable from the relevant value-
perspective than all its alternatives. The greater economic efficiency 
of a policy does not guarantee its greater moral desirability.  
 Second, even if one could instantiate a given distributional value 
to the relevant desired extent not only least economically ineffi-
ciently but also most desirably by varying earned-income tax rates 
exclusively, that fact would not warrant the conclusion that other 
methods of effectuating the relevant distributional value to the de-
                                                                                                                    
 65. These propositions are implied by Kaplow and Shavell’s claim that “normative 
economic analysis of legal rules should focus [exclusively] on [economic] efficiency.” Kaplow 
& Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 4, at 821. 
 66. I will treat these objections only briefly here. For a more detailed discussion, see 
Richard S. Markovits, Sacrificing Economic Efficiency to Effectuate Distributional Values: 
A Critique of Kaplow and Shavell’s Conclusions About the Prescriptive-Moral Import of the 
Double-Distortion Argument (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
2001]                          ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 39 
 
sired extent ought to be rejected if the earned-income tax-rate policy 
is politically unavailable.  
 Third, even if an appropriate earned-income tax policy would be 
able to effectuate a given distributional value to the desired extent 
least economically inefficiently and most desirably if transaction-cost 
considerations were ignored, the transaction-cost considerations 
might make it more economically efficient and/or more desirable to 
use some other policy that does generate a double distortion to in-
stantiate the value in question. For example, if it were more transac-
tion-costly to determine earned income directly with various degrees 
of accuracy than to determine one or more other things that are 
highly correlated with earned income with some relevant degree of 
accuracy, it might be more economically efficient and more desirable 
overall to effectuate the valued redistribution by taxing something 
other than earned income or promulgating or enforcing some eco-
nomically inefficient legal rule than by taxing earned income.  
 Fourth, since an individual’s richness or poorness depends not 
only on his earned income but also on his unearned income and 
wealth,67 taxes on earned income will not be able to effectuate per-
fectly distributional values that essentially favor redistributions be-
tween income/wealth classes. In the unlikely event that there is no 
correlation between an individual’s earned income and his in-
come/wealth position, taxes on earned income may have no useful 
role to play in effectuating this kind of value. Even if (as I believe) 
such a correlation exists, it may be desirable to redistribute income 
from the richer to the poorer or between income/wealth classes, inter 
alia, by levying taxes on investment income and wealth, despite the 
fact that such taxes will generate double distortions by distorting 
savings/consumption/current and future gift-giving/“bequesting” 
choices as well as market-labor/do-it-yourself labor/leisure choices. 
Admittedly, however, this criticism could be viewed as a friendly 
amendment to the Double-Distortion Argument argument for relying 
exclusively on taxes to redistribute income from the rich to the poor 
or vice versa, an amendment that simply requires the relevant ar-
gument to be relabeled a Extra Distortion Argument argument. This 
admission reflects the fact that any attempt to redistribute resources 
from the rich to the poor or vice versa by making prices, liability 
rules, damages, or fines depend on the relevant party’s or parties’ in-
come/wealth positions when it is not economically efficient to do so 
will misallocate resources not only by distorting their (1) market-
labor/do-it-yourself labor/leisure choices and (2) sav-
ings/consumption/current and future gift-giving/“bequesting” choices 
                                                                                                                    
 67. As well as on his disabilities, his health, the quantity of his leisure, the intrinsic 
attractiveness of his labor, and various other attributes of his person and situation. 
40  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1 
 
but also by distorting their (3) product-purchasing, tort-avoidance, 
contract-violation, etc., choices.  
 Fifth, even if the Double-Distortion Argument (or its Extra-
Distortion Argument analogue) did demonstrate that redistributions 
between income/wealth classes can be effectuated not only least eco-
nomically inefficiently but also most desirably through the exclusive 
use of taxes on earned income, unearned income, and wealth and 
even if such a tax policy were politically available, those facts would 
not imply that one ought not use other policies that would yield dou-
ble or extra distortions or misallocate resources for other reasons to 
effectuate other kinds of distributional norms that do not essentially 
favor redistributions between income/wealth classes. This latter 
category of norms includes norms that relate to the positive rights 
that moral-rights holders possess, corrective-justice norms, and vari-
ous other kinds of distributional norms such as libertarian distribu-
tional norms that, roughly speaking, value people’s receiving incomes 
that match their moral deserts and are essentially indifferent to the 
shape of the income/wealth distribution that results.  
 And sixth, at least in rights-based societies in which adjudicators 
are morally obligated to resolve the legal-rights claims before them 
in a way that is not internally wrong,68 adjudicators will be morally 
obligated to, and virtually always ought to,69 enforce statutorily cre-
ated or constitutionally created legal rights that legislators or consti-
tutional ratifiers created to redistribute income to their beneficiaries. 
I should add that all adjudicators will have such moral obligations 
even when the relevant provision cannot be justified in any princi-
pled way so long as it does not violate anyone’s rights directly (for 
example, by manifesting a prejudice). Hence, the Double Distortion 
Argument does not justify the conclusion that public decision makers 
ought never try to redistribute income by means other than varying 
the tax rates to be applied to earned income. In many situations, 
from various value-perspectives, public decision makers ought to re-
distribute income in ways that generate double (or extra) distortions 
or cause greater misallocation for other reasons per dollar trans-
ferred than taxes on earned income (earned income, unearned in-
come, and wealth) would cause for the average dollar they trans-
ferred. 
                                                                                                                    
 68. If my belief that there are internally right answers to all legal-rights questions in 
a rights-based culture is correct, the text should read “in the internally correct way.” 
 69. Obviously, this judgment reflects my own personal ultimate values. It also reflects 
my assumption that the relevant society is a society of moral integrity and that the inter-
nally correct answer to the legal-rights question before the court is not critically affected by 
a provision in the society’s constitution that is inconsistent with its moral commitments 
and whose implications were reasonably well understood by its ratifiers. 
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 3.   Contributions of Economic-Efficiency Analysis 
 Part III has argued that economic-efficiency analysis is not an al-
gorithm for moral-rights analysis or moral-ought analysis. However, 
I do not want to leave the impression that economic-efficiency analy-
sis or economics in general cannot make a significant contribution to 
prescriptive moral analysis. I will therefore conclude by briefly list-
ing and illustrating three kinds of contributions that economics can 
make to these types of inquiries. 
 First, as I have already suggested, in many situations economic-
efficiency analysis can play a useful role in pure utilitarian evalua-
tions or in evaluations that are partially based on utilitarian values. 
This claim reflects my belief that it will often be more desirable from 
many legitimate value-perspectives to generate utilitarian conclu-
sions circuitously—by predicting the equivalent-dollar gains and 
losses different choices will generate and the average utility the rele-
vant winners will obtain and losers will lose per equivalent dollar 
they respectively win or lose—than directly by focusing 
straightforwardly on the effect of the choices under consideration on 
total utility. 
 Second, as I have also already suggested, economics can some-
times reveal ambiguities in the formulation of particular values, 
facts that call those values into question, and weaknesses in argu-
ments that employ particular values. Thus, economics can demon-
strate that those who believe that “people ought to receive resources 
equal in value or proportionate to what they produce” need to indi-
cate whether the referent of “what they produce” is an individual’s 
marginal revenue product, marginal allocative product, the average 
revenue product of all equally skilled and assiduous workers to per-
form that individual’s type of labor, or the average allocative product 
of all members of this class of workers, because these concepts not 
only differ definitionally but also tend to have very different empiri-
cal values in the real world. Economics can also show that the claim 
that individuals ought to receive or are entitled to receive resources 
equal in value to what they produced in any of these senses is called 
into question by the fact that an individual’s product in any of these 
senses is a function not only of genetic and nurturing factors over 
which he had no control but also of various “non-personal” factors 
over which he had no control: the tastes of members of his commu-
nity; the number of others who are able to perform the type of labor 
he would find most attractive to perform, all things considered; the 
opportunity cost to those others of performing this type of labor; the 
“availability” of complements to the labor inputs he can supply or to 
the goods and services he can produce; and, perhaps most damningly, 
the distribution of income in his community  
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 Relatedly, economics can reveal the implicit assumptions in nor-
mative distributional arguments. For example, economics reveals 
that the argument that the value “people ought to be paid according 
to what they produce” implies that the government ought not redis-
tribute income implicitly assumes either (A) (1) that this value as-
serts that people ought to be paid their marginal allocative products 
and (2) that the Pareto imperfections our economy contains do not 
cause people to be paid more or less than their marginal allocative 
products or (B) (1) that this value asserts that people ought to be 
paid in proportion to their average allocative products, marginal re-
source products, or average resource products and (2) that for some 
fortuitous reasons their earned income would follow this pattern if 
government made no effort to redistribute income. 
 Similarly, economics reveals that liberals who accept the dualist 
position that the moral obligations of individuals when acting in 
their private capacities are different from their moral obligations 
when acting in their political capacities may conclude that potential 
accident or pollution-loss injurers and victims are obligated to make 
those avoidance choices and only those avoidance choices they would 
make if they counted others’ net equivalent-dollar losses as their 
own—those choices that the type of analysis that would be third-
best-allocatively-efficient for them to execute would conclude would 
be economically efficient for them to make. (The analysis that would 
be third-best-allocatively-efficient for them to execute would depend 
among other things on the multiplicity of Pareto imperfections in the 
system, the cost to them of collecting data on those imperfections of 
varying degrees of accuracy, and the cost to them of executing rele-
vant theoretical analyses of different quality.) 
 Third and finally, in a world in which the evaluator does not have 
the option of eliminating all the distributional imperfections in his 
society, Second-Best Theory70: 
                                                                                                                    
 70. The General Theory of Second Best demonstrates the following proposition: Given 
a series of conditions whose fulfillment guarantees the achievement of an optimum, if one 
or more of those conditions cannot be fulfilled, there is no general reason to believe that 
reducing the number of remaining optimal conditions that are not fulfilled or the extent to 
which they are not fulfilled will even tend to bring one closer to the optimum. The intuitive 
explanation for this conclusion is that, in general, the imperfections one can eliminate will 
be as likely to counteract as to compound the net effect of the imperfections that one can-
not or will not eliminate. Second-Best Theory does not counsel despair. In addition to ex-
plaining why one cannot assume, without further argument, that policies that reduce the 
number or extent of imperfections in a system will improve outcomes if some imperfections 
remain, it provides insight into the structure that arguments must have to justify the con-
clusion that in a particular case a policy that decreases (or, for that matter, increases) a 
particular relevant imperfection will tend to improve outcomes. Economists usually employ 
The General Theory of Second Best to determine whether a policy that will reduce the ex-
tent of so-called Pareto imperfections will tend to increase economic efficiency. But its ba-
sic point and implications apply mutatis mutandis when the goal is to increase the effec-
tuation of some distributional norm rather than to increase economic efficiency and the 
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(1) Can teach him that, unless he can devise an appropriate argu-
ment to the contrary, choices that reduce or eliminate one or more 
distributional imperfections without eliminating them all will be 
as likely to worsen the distribution of income from his value per-
spective as to improve it; and 
 
(2) Can reveal the structure of the analysis he will have to execute 
to determine whether in any given case choices that reduce or 
eliminate a particular distributional imperfection or, indeed, that 
increase or introduce a particular distributional imperfection, will 
improve the distribution of income from his perspective. 
IV.   ECONOMIC-EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AS AN ALGORITHM FOR 
GENERATING INTERNALLY CORRECT LEGAL-RIGHTS CONCLUSIONS IN A 
LIBERAL, RIGHTS-BASED CULTURE 
 Part II’s analysis of legal rights indicated that some legal rights 
are moral-rights-related, some are created by State acts designed to 
instantiate a particular ultimate value, an ultimate-value combina-
tion, or set of morally defensible concrete goals, and some are gener-
ated by State choices that were designed to provide economic rents 
for their beneficiaries or were made for other more or less dubious 
reasons. Part II also indicated that the assessment of moral-rights-
related legal rights claims is controlled by the moral principles to 
which our society is committed and that the assessment of legal 
rights claims that are based on State law-creating acts designed to 
effectuate one or more personal ultimate values or defensible con-
crete goals is controlled by the substance of the ultimate value(s) or 
concrete goals in question if the relevant law-creating texts properly 
reflect their ratifiers’ intent but may also depend on canons of statu-
tory interpretation when the relevant texts are imperfectly drafted. 
Finally, Part II indicated that the interpretation of State law-
creating acts that reflected rent-seeking or other dubious types of 
State law-creating choices will also involve textual and other kinds of 
legal arguments that are neither moral-principle-oriented nor per-
sonal-ultimate-value-oriented. Most important for present purposes, 
Part II also revealed that the preceding general conclusions are not 
                                                                                                                    
imperfections in the system are distributional imperfections rather than Pareto imperfec-
tions. For the initial formal statement of The General Theory of Second Best, see Richard 
G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 
(1956). For a general analysis of the implications of Second-Best Theory for law-and-
economics, see Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Intro-
duction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1998). For a critique of the various justifications that 
economists and law-and-economics scholars typically offer for ignoring Second-Best The-
ory, see Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Obligations of Academics: A Re-
ply to Professor Donohue, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 267 (1998). 
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particularly sensitive to one’s conclusions about legitimate legal ar-
gument in our culture. 
A.   When the Internally Right Answer to the Legal-Rights Question Is 
Moral-Principle-Based Because the Relevant Legal Right Derives 
from a Moral Right 
 I believe that most common law, many constitutional law, and 
some statutory rights are moral-rights-based and that decisions 
about legal rights claims that are based on moral rights turn on 
moral-rights analysis. Although others think that I exaggerate the 
frequency with which arguments of moral principle control legitimate 
legal rights argument directly71 and/or that I have misidentified the 
moral principle our society is committed to instantiating in its moral-
rights discourse,72 supporters of a wide variety of jurisprudential po-
sitions support the view that, in at least some cases, arguments of 
moral principle directly determine the internally right answer to the 
legal-rights question at issue.73 More specifically, Philip Bobbitt, 
some Legal Realists such as Karl Llewellyn, Ronald Dworkin, John 
Hart Ely, and many legal historians of ideology would support this 
conclusion. 
 Of course, the issue with which we are currently concerned is not 
whether these experts believe that the internally right answers to 
some moral-rights-related legal-rights questions are controlled by 
moral principle but whether the instantiation of the various moral 
principles they think are controlling is consistent with economic effi-
ciency. To analyze this issue, I will first comment on the substance of 
the various moral principles that the legal experts in question believe 
control the internally right answer to some legal-rights questions and 
then examine the compatibility of these particular moral principles 
with economic efficiency. 
 Of the legal experts who accept that moral principle controls the 
internally right answer to at least some moral-rights-related legal-
                                                                                                                    
 71. I believe that scholars who claim that I exaggerate the extent to which arguments 
of moral principle control legitimate legal-rights argument do so at least in part because 
they fail to note that my claim relates to normative domination, not actual domination 
(note the word “legitimate” in its articulation). I admit that, given the “conventionalist” 
character of my approach to moral and legitimate legal argument, a demonstration that 
arguments of moral principle do not actually dominate legal argument in the sense in 
which I claim it normatively dominates legal argument counts against my normative 
domination claim, though the force of such evidence is weakened by the fact that the con-
ventionalist approach I believe is warranted is “qualified” in the APPENDIX. For a debate in 
which the distinction between normative and actual domination plays a central role, see 
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 22; Richard S. Markovits, “You Cannot Be Serious!”: A Re-
ply to Professors Balkin and Levinson, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559 (1999). 
 72. I assume that scholars who believe that our society is committed to libertarian, 
civic-republican, or communitarian norms would make this objection. 
 73. Markovits, Internally-Right Answers, supra note 9, at 435-60. 
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rights questions, many believe that, at least in our society, the moral 
principle in question is liberal. This conclusion is obviously justified 
in relation to Ronald Dworkin, but I think it also applies to John 
Hart Ely, Philip Bobbitt, and Karl Llewellyn. In Ely’s case, it is im-
plied by the fact that Ely’s argument for the fundamental character 
of the three sets of rights he claims the Constitution’s text indicates 
are constitutionally fundamental assumes that our society is a liberal 
society. In Bobbitt’s case, it is implied by the close connection be-
tween his conclusion about the central attribute of our ethos of gov-
ernment—namely, our commitment to limited government—and the 
liberal commitment to valuing each individual’s developing his own 
conception of the good. In Llewellyn’s case, it is at least suggested by 
the connection between the value of fair notice, which underlies Lle-
wellyn’s conclusion that vague and open-textured language in the 
Uniform Commercial Code should be interpreted in the way that is 
most consistent with relevant business practice, and the liberal value 
of appropriate, equal respect. Of course other legal experts who be-
lieve that the internally right answers to at least some moral-rights-
related legal-rights questions are controlled by moral principle think 
that the applicable moral principle is not liberal. Thus, some legal 
historians of ideology think that our society is committed to civic-
republican or communitarian values, and others at least flirt with 
the idea that our society is committed to and our law incorporates 
libertarian values. 
 Part III’s demonstration that the basic liberal moral principle will 
often not favor economically efficient decisions implies that the con-
clusion that the internally right answer to all moral-rights related 
legal-rights questions will always be economically efficient would be 
rejected not only be me but also by a variety of other legal experts 
who disagree with me on some issues but do agree that the internally 
right answers to at least some moral-rights-related legal-rights ques-
tions are controlled by liberal moral principles. 
 Scholars who contend that our society and Constitution have 
adopted communitarian values will also not believe that the inter-
nally right answer to all the moral-rights-related legal-rights ques-
tions that theses values control will be economically efficient. Take, 
for example, prohibitions of acts (reading particular books, seeing 
particular movies, dressing in particular ways, comporting oneself in 
a particular manner, engaging in certain kinds of sex, etc.) on which 
a deviant minority place a high equivalent-dollar value but a major-
ity disvalues in part because they consider such conduct sinful and/or 
disruptive of the way of life they wish to foster. Assume that the in-
dividual deviant members of the community who want to engage in 
such conduct place a positive equivalent-dollar value on their doing 
so that is much higher than the negative equivalent-dollar values 
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that individual members of the majority place on the deviants’ 
engaging in the conduct in question. Since communitarians would 
not believe that the magnitude of the relevant parties’ absolute 
equivalent-dollar evaluations should determine the number of votes 
they have on such issues—they would place the highest value on the 
majority’s being able to preserve the way of life the majority values 
(indeed, would conclude that individual members of the majority 
have a moral right to preserve the way of life these individuals 
value)—communitarian values would sometimes favor prohibitions 
that are economically inefficient. 
 I suspect that libertarian principles will also favor economically 
inefficient moral-rights decisions and hence economically inefficient 
moral-rights-related legal-rights decisions. When non-distributional 
moral rights are at stake, this conclusion follows from the fact that 
libertarian and liberal conclusions are often similar or identical. 
When distributional moral rights are at stake, the analysis is compli-
cated by the ambiguity of the relevant libertarian norm. If, as my ex-
perience suggests, libertarians believe that all individuals are enti-
tled to be paid wages that are proportionate to the average allocative 
products of the class of equally able and equally industrious workers 
who perform their respective types of labor, the instantiation of this 
norm will be incompatible with the achievement of economic effi-
ciency. If libertarians believe that each individual is entitled to be 
paid the marginal allocative product of the last equally able and 
equally assiduous worker to perform his type of labor, the instantia-
tion of this norm will also be incompatible with the maximization of 
economic efficiency in our actual, highly Pareto-imperfect world for 
two reasons: (1) because of the allocative cost of generating the val-
ued distribution and (2) because of the externalities that this distri-
bution will generate both directly by pleasing and displeasing indi-
viduals who subscribe respectively to libertarian and non-libertarian 
values and indirectly by affecting the consumption and labor deci-
sions of various individuals—externalities that the relevant libertar-
ian distributional norm deems irrelevant and that often libertarian 
norms may not internalize or may internalize only at some allocative 
transaction cost. And if libertarians believe that individuals are enti-
tled to keep whatever they receive through gift or bequest, the effec-
tuation of this norm will be economically inefficient insofar as it gives 
individuals incentives to behave in economically inefficient ways to 
elicit such gifts and bequests. 
 In short, (1) many legal experts who disagree with me on impor-
tant issues related to legitimate and valid legal argument agree that 
moral principles control the internally right answers to some moral-
rights-related legal-rights questions and (2) although some of these 
legal experts think that the moral principle that controls the inter-
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nally right answer to some legal-rights questions is not liberal (is 
communitarian or libertarian), none of the principles the different 
experts think control the internally right answer to at least some 
moral-rights-related legal-rights questions always favors the eco-
nomically efficient answer to such questions.  
B.   When the Internally Right Answer to the Legal-Rights Question Is 
Personal-Ultimate-Value-Based or Goal-Based Because the Relevant 
Legal Right Was Created by a Properly Drafted Provision that Was 
Designed to Instantiate a Personal Ultimate Value or Achieve a 
Legitimate Concrete Goal 
 Part II indicated that legal experts who subscribe to a wide vari-
ety of jurisprudential positions agree that the internally right answer 
to many legal-rights questions is the answer that instantiates the 
specific legislators’ motivating personal ultimate value or the State’s 
consistently adopted personal ultimate value or secures a concrete 
goal a legislature or administrative rulemaker sought to achieve. 
Part III’s rejection of the claim that economic-efficiency analysis can 
serve as an algorithm for the generation of moral-ought conclusions 
in our culture—in part because the effectuation of many personal ul-
timate values will sometimes decrease economic efficiency—clearly 
implies that economic-efficiency analysis can also not serve as a uni-
versal algorithm for the generation of right answers to legal-rights 
questions that have correct answers that instantiate particular per-
sonal ultimate values or secure particular concrete goals. 
 Admittedly, the proximate goal of some statutes may be to in-
crease economic efficiency. When efficiency is the goal, it is appropri-
ate to interpret ambiguous statutory language in a way that 
maximizes economic efficiency. However, because I think that 
economists vastly exaggerate the number of statutes that were in-
tended by their ratifiers to increase economic efficiency,74 I suspect 
that economic-efficiency analysis can rarely serve as an algorithm for 
the generation of internal-to-law, correct interpretations of statutory 
language in our culture. 
                                                                                                                    
 74. For example, contrary to the view of most economists and lawyer-economists, I do 
not think that the American antitrust laws were designed to maximize economic efficiency 
or should be interpreted in the way that would maximize economic efficiency. Richard S. 
Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A Re-
view Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567, 577-94 (1979). I hasten to add that many economists 
acknowledge (indeed, stress) that much or most legislation reflects its supporters’ rent-
seeking rather than their pursuit of economic efficiency. 
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C.   When the Right Answer to the Legal-Rights Question Turns on 
Textual, Historical, Structural, or Other Considerations That Are Not 
Captured by Any Moral Principle or Personal Ultimate Value 
 Part II also revealed that a wide variety of jurisprudential posi-
tions imply that the internally right answer to some legal-rights 
questions turn on neither moral principles nor personal ultimate 
values. These positions imply that the internally correct interpreta-
tion of many legal texts involves no reference to moral norms at all. 
Because economists recognize (indeed, stress) that the substance of 
many statutes is hard to justify in prescriptive moral terms and that 
many law creators do not aim to increase economic efficiency, they 
should not be surprised that economic-efficiency analysis cannot 
serve as an algorithm for the interpretation of these types of law-
creating acts. 
* * * * 
 Part IV has argued that economic-efficiency analysis is not an al-
gorithm for the analysis of any of the three general types of legal 
rights I distinguished. Its discussion of this issue complements Part 
III’s critique of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument that courts ought al-
ways adopt economically efficient legal rules. However, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that this conclusion does not imply that economic-
efficiency analysis is never relevant to legal-rights analysis. To the 
contrary, economic-efficiency analysis will clearly be relevant to the 
interpretation of vague or open-textured language in statutes that 
were designed to achieve the proximate, concrete goal of maximizing 
economic efficiency or that were at least partially motivated by utili-
tarian concerns. Moreover, if I am correct in concluding (1) that the 
United States is a liberal, rights-based society, (2) that such societies 
are obligated to protect the moral rights of those for whom it is re-
sponsible, (3) that the liberal dualists are correct in differentiating 
the private and political obligations of members of liberal, rights-
based States, and (4) when acting in their private capacities, mem-
bers of a liberal, rights-based State are obligated to make all avoid-
ance moves they would find profitable if they did an economically ef-
ficient amount of research into the consequences of their avoidance 
decisions and counted the equivalent-dollar effects of their choices on 
others as if they experienced those effects themselves, then an ap-
propriate version of third-best-allocative-efficiency analysis—one 
that takes into account not only the existence of imperfections other 
than the imperfection to which the law is directly responding but also 
the allocative cost the relevant actors would have to generate to col-
lect data and execute analysis of varying degrees of accuracy—will 
determine the tort-law obligations of such actors. Similarly, in the 
United States, economic-efficiency analyses may also have a critical 
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role to play in the resolution of a number of Commerce Clause and 
Federalism issues. I could go on, but the point should by now be 
clear: Even though economic-efficiency analysis is not nearly so rele-
vant to legal-rights analysis as many economists and law-and-
economics scholars claim, it can make significant contributions to le-
gal-rights analysis in many contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
 Most economists and law-and-economics scholars write and talk 
as if all economically efficient choices are consistent with our moral-
rights commitments and would also be desirable if they were not pro-
scribed or required by our moral-rights commitments. The literature 
contains hundreds of articles that implicitly assume this proposition 
and a few that explicitly try to justify it. Relatedly, many economists 
and law-and-economics scholars explicitly argue or implicitly assume 
that economic-efficiency analysis is an algorithm for the discovery of 
moral-rights-related common law and Constitutional rights and for 
the interpretation of statutes that were designed to achieve utilitar-
ian goals. 
 This Article has analyzed the relevance of economic-efficiency con-
clusions to moral-ought, moral-rights, and various types of legal-
rights analysis. It has demonstrated that, although economic-
efficiency analysis can sometimes contribute to moral-ought, moral-
rights, and legal-rights analyses, it is not generally an algorithm for 
the generation of any of these types of conclusions. In the course of 
establishing these conclusions, the Article has refuted various argu-
ments that highly regarded economists or law-and-economics schol-
ars have made to support their belief that economically efficient po-
lices are always just and desirable. 
 Unfortunately, the tendency of economists to exaggerate the rele-
vance of economic-efficiency analysis and conclusions is not just of 
academic interest. At least in the United States, the economics pro-
fession’s exaggerated claims for the relevance of economic efficiency 
has caused public decisionmakers of all types to abdicate their moral 
responsibility both to base their decisions on rights-related issues on 
the moral principles we are committed to using in such contexts and 
to base their decisions on issues whose resolution is not determined 
by our rights-commitments on one or more appropriate personal ul-
timate values. The exaggerated claims that economists make for eco-
nomic-efficiency conclusions not only cause public decisionmakers to 
violate moral and legal rights and to make choices that are undesir-
able from various value-perspectives—moral-rights considerations 
aside—but also create a risk that a public backlash may develop that 
will prevent economics from playing the useful role it can perform in 
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policy and legal-rights analysis. This Article is motivated not only by 
my desire to “get it right” but also my desire to prevent these damag-
ing outcomes. 
APPENDIX 
 This APPENDIX presents highly schematic accounts of six ap-
proaches to prescriptive moral analysis. Four of these approaches are 
“foundationalist” in the broader sense of that term—that is, they are 
designed to discover universally binding norms of justice. The re-
maining two approaches are much less ambitious. Proponents of 
these two non-foundationalist, “conventionalist” approaches reject 
the claim that there are universally binding norms of justice and 
concentrate on describing the moral practices of particular societies. 
 The four methodologies that are “foundationalist” in the broad 
sense of that term certainly overlap and may be coincident. The term 
“foundationalist” is used not only in the broad sense defined above 
but also in a narrow sense to denominate a particular approach to 
discovering universally binding norms of justice. Analyses that are 
“foundationalist” in this narrower sense proceed on the assumption 
that humans can recognize the basic universal norms of justice in 
something like the way we have access to truths about the physical 
world. Perhaps for this reason, philosophers who are foundationalist 
in this narrower sense tend to think that the best way to persuade 
others that a particular moral norm is the universally binding norm 
of justice is to give an account of societies that consistently imple-
ment the norm in question and compare such societies with societies 
of moral integrity that consistently implement other moral norms. 
 A second approach to moral-rights or justice analysis, which may 
be a variant of the first, might be called Aristotelian. The Aristote-
lian approach begins by developing an account of “human flourish-
ing” and proceeds on the assumption that the moral norm whose ef-
fectuation would contribute most to human flourishing is the univer-
sally binding norm of justice. 
 A third approach to justice or moral-rights analysis is the “con-
structivist” approach associated with Kant. Although the following 
sketch of constructivist approaches may be even less adequate than 
the preceding descriptions of foundationalist and Aristotelian meth-
odologies, I would say that constructivist approaches to justice use 
reason to explore the implications of a particular understanding of 
the goal of conversations about justice and moral rights—namely, to 
identify moral norms whose authority over us does not infringe our 
freedom. 
 A fourth approach to justice analysis that is foundationalist in the 
broader sense is the Natural Law approach. To be honest, I find it 
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difficult to provide even a sketch of the Natural Law methodology. 
My difficulties reflect both (1) the fact that many of the Natural Law 
philosophers I have read do not devote much attention to methodo-
logical issues and (2) my suspicion that different Natural Law phi-
losophers use quite different approaches—for example, that the 
methodology that underlies Hobbes’ reference to a Natural Law of 
self-defense differs significantly from the methodology that more 
modern Natural Law philosophers employ. Perhaps not. Perhaps the 
Natural Law approach proceeds on the assumption that acts or deci-
sions are just if they are consistent with the universal nature of hu-
man beings. If so, the Natural Law methodology may be closer to the 
Aristotelian approach than one might otherwise think. 
 The last two methodologies I will describe are conventionalist, not 
foundationalist in the broader sense. Conventionalist methodologies 
do not attempt to articulate universally binding moral norms of any 
kind. On the assumption that one cannot go at all beyond the “is” of 
moral practice or enough beyond the “is” of the moral practice of par-
ticular communities to generate universally binding moral norms, 
conventionalists attempt to provide detailed accounts of the conduct 
of particular communities that its members consider to have a “moral 
dimension” in some sense that conventionalists leave more or less 
undefined. I will distinguish two variants of the conventionalist ap-
proach, which actually occupy extreme positions on the conventional-
ist continuum. 
 I denominate the first conventionalist methodology “pure conven-
tionalism.” The pure conventionalist employs no concept of “a com-
munity of moral integrity,” of “moral norm,” or of “acting from a 
moral position.” This admittedly fictional figure simply reports the 
conduct of the communities he studies that its members consider to 
have a moral dimension in some undefined sense—that is, simply re-
ports the self-described “moral” conventions of particular communi-
ties. The pure conventionalist does not comment, for example, on the 
possible moral significance of the fact that a society that is commit-
ted to liberalism in its moral-rights discourse makes legal decisions 
that do not instantiate liberal principles (that is, does not comment 
on the implications of this inconsistency for the moral integrity of the 
community in question). He also does not remark on the possible 
moral significance of the fact that the society he is studying has a 
caste system that it does not try to justify or justicize (render just) in 
any way. Indeed, if the society consistently applies caste-based deci-
sion-rules and decision-standards, the pure conventionalist will say 
no more than that this practice is part of the morality of the commu-
nity in question. Conventionalists who are “pure” in the sense in 
which I am using this terminology will also not ask whether a nar-
row-gauged practice that is inconsistent with the “best” account that 
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can be given of a particular society’s general or broad-gauged moral 
practice is immoral by the society’s own standards: if the narrow-
gauged practice is consistently followed, the pure conventionalist will 
describe it to be part of the community’s moral practice. 
 This last point may be clarified through an illustration. Assume 
that the “best” account that can be given of a particular society’s 
broad-gauged moral practice implies that it is a liberal, rights-based 
society.75 Assume in addition that this conclusion partly reflects the 
fact that members of the relevant society: 
(1) Give substantial positive weight to the interests individuals 
have in forming and participating in intimate relationships that 
contribute to their discovering their personal ultimate values as 
well as to their actualizing these values; and 
 
(2) Give a positive weight as well to the desire of individuals to ex-
perience and give pleasure. 
Now assume that this same society penalizes adults who participate 
in voluntary homosexual sexual activity on the ground that it dis-
gusts the majority of its members even when such activity contrib-
utes to the formation and maintenance of broader intimate relation-
ships. Assume as well that this society imposes no penalties on 
adults who participate in voluntary heterosexual sexual activity. The 
pure conventionalist would categorize this society’s consistent treat-
ment of homosexuals who engage in such sexual conduct as part of 
its morality. The pure conventionalist would not ask whether “dis-
gust” can justify or justicize penalizing adult participants in volun-
tary homosexual sexual conduct. The pure conventionalist also would 
not ask whether this treatment of the relevant homosexuals might 
not be immoral by the community’s own standards because it was in-
consistent with the best account of the community’s broad-gauged 
moral practice. The pure conventionalist would simply accept the 
community’s own assessment of the morality of its narrow-gauged 
conduct. 
 The second kind of conventionalist approach and sixth type of 
methodology I want to describe overall might be termed a “qualified 
conventionalist” approach. This type of conventionalist approach is 
“qualified” because it proceeds on the assumption that the notions 
“moral norm,” “acting from a moral position,” and “being an individ-
ual or society of ‘moral integrity’” have some essentialist attributes—
                                                                                                                    
 75. I assume that such accounts are evaluated according to a “fit” criterion (how well 
do they fit the community’s relevant behaviors and perceptions) and an “explicability-of-
(non-fit)” criterion (to what extent can the relevant non-fits be explained in ways that re-
duce the damage they do to the relevant account’s persuasiveness). For a fuller description 
of this protocol, see MARKOVITS, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 9, at 13-34. 
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for example, that an individual or a State cannot be said to have 
moral integrity unless they behave morally consistently to some 
hard-to-specify extent. A qualified conventionalist would therefore 
conclude that a consistent narrow-gauged practice was immoral for 
essentialist reasons if its alleged justification (disgust) were unac-
ceptable and was immoral by the community’s own standards if it 
were inconsistent with the best account of the community’s commit-
ments—perhaps with the way in which the society in question gen-
erally responded to conduct that implicated the same interests that 
the narrow-gauged practice affects to the same extent that the nar-
row-gauged practice did. 
 As I indicated earlier, most conventionalists fall somewhere be-
tween the pure conventionalist and qualified conventionalist poles of 
the conventionalist distribution. In practice, I doubt if any conven-
tionalist is willing to accept a community’s “own perception of the 
moral dimensions of conduct” (whatever that might mean)—that is, 
all conventionalists assume that the concept “moral” has some essen-
tialist elements. However, many conventionalists seem willing to ac-
cept as “moral” (1) a community’s use of a caste system that it con-
siders to be moral despite the fact that it offers no justification for 
the system in question and (2) a community’s unreasoned refusal to 
instantiate the same set of norms in different spheres of activities, 
and some conventionalists seem also willing to characterize as moral 
a community’s consistent narrow-gauged practice that is inconsistent 
with its broad-gauged practice in what would appear to be the same 
sphere of activities. 
 My approach to analyzing the moral character and more specific-
moral commitments of any particular society such as the United 
States is qualified conventionalist. However, it is important to em-
phasize that my critique of the claims that economists make for the 
relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions to prescriptive moral 
analysis does not depend on the “correctness” of this methodology. 
That critique depends solely on the coherence of moral norms that do 
not focus exclusively on the maximization or distribution of utility 
and, more particularly, on the conclusion that the various moral 
norms of this sort that can be distinguished (the liberal norm I think 
the United States is committed to instantiating when making deci-
sions that implicate moral rights, various types of libertarian norms, 
and the various non-liberal and non-utilitarian egalitarian norms on 
which members of our society base their conclusions about what 
morally-ought to be done) do not always favor the economically effi-
cient choice. Since (1) philosophers who are foundationalist in the 
broader sense of that term believe that such norms are coherent and 
(2) proponents of all the methodologies this APPENDIX has sketched 
may accept my account of the various norms in question, my refuta-
54  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1 
 
tion of the claims that economists make for the prescriptive moral 
relevance of economic-efficiency conclusions does not depend on the 
correctness of the prescriptive moral methodology I employ. 
